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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
One important prerequisite for sustainable economic growth – which is an important goal for 
many emerging countries – is access to finance (Ayyagari, Demirguec-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). Unfortunately, access to financing for companies in 
emerging countries is often hindered by severe information asymmetry (Atkins & Glen, 1992).  
Auditing is one of the monitoring mechanisms used by firms to reduce agency problems between 
managers and company‟s stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). 
By verifying the validity of financial statements and providing assurance that financial statements 
faithfully reflect a company‟s underlying economics, auditors play a role as financial 
intermediaries enhancing the credibility of financial information (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & 
Subramanyam, 1998; DeFond & Zhang, 2014) and reducing information asymmetry.  
All the three studies in this dissertation use Indonesia as a research setting. Indonesia is one of the 
emerging countries where the litigation risk is considered to be low. The international audit firms 
can only enter to the Indonesian market by affiliation with local audit firms. 
The first study examines whether the affiliation of local audit firms with a Big4 audit firms can 
reduces the cost of debt for listed companies in Indonesia. This study demonstrates that companies 
audited by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm enjoy significantly lower interest rates 
even in a less-litigious environment like Indonesia. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
creditors perceive the choice of a reputable high quality auditor as a signal of credible financial 
information.  
The second study investigates whether the potential impact of foreign investors and board 
members might have on auditor choice depends on whether they originate from a developed 
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versus from another emerging country. This study highlights that in an emerging country like 
Indonesia especially ownership and board membership from developed foreign countries is 
positively associated with the selection of Big4 audit firms. This finding supports the view that 
cultural differences drive different tendencies of auditor choice. Foreign investors and board 
members from developed countries probably attach more importance on the assurance from high 
quality Big4 audit firms, as compared to foreign investors from emerging countries.  
The third study examines whether in Indonesia, a company‟s choice of a local audit firm affiliated 
with a Big4 audit firm affects its capital structure. The study documents that companies audited by 
local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm display lower debt ratios than those audited by 
other audit firms. This finding consistents with the idea that local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm are perceived to have higher quality, thus potentially reduced information asymmetry 




NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
Een belangrijke voorwaarde voor duurzame economische groei - een belangrijk doel voor veel 
opkomende landen - is toegang tot financiering (Ayyagari, Demirguec-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 
2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). Helaas wordt de toegang tot financiering voor 
bedrijven in opkomende landen vaak gehinderd door ernstige informatieasymmetrie (Atkins & 
Glen, 1992). Auditing is een van de monitoringmechanismen die door bedrijven worden gebruikt 
om agency-problemen tussen managers en bedrijfsbelangen te verminderen (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976, Watts & Zimmerman, 1983). Door de geldigheid van jaarrekeningen te verifiëren en de 
garantie te geven dat jaarrekeningen getrouw de onderliggende economie van een bedrijf 
weergeven, spelen auditors een rol als financiële intermediairs die de geloofwaardigheid van 
financiële informatie vergroten (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; DeFond & 
Zhang, 2014 ) en het verminderen van informatieasymmetrie. 
Alle drie de studies in deze dessertatie gebruiken Indonesië als onderzoeksomgeving. Indonesië is 
een van de opkomende landen waar het procesvoeringsrisico laag is. De internationale 
auditkantoren kunnen alleen toetreden tot de Indonesische markt door aansluiting bij lokale 
accountantskantoren. 
De eerste studie onderzoekt of de aansluiting van lokale auditkantoren bij een Big4-
accountantsorganisatie de kosten van schulden voor beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in Indonesië 
kan verminderen. Deze studie toont aan dat bedrijven die zijn gecontroleerd door lokale 
auditkantoren die zijn aangesloten bij een Big4-accountantskantoor, aanzienlijk lagere 
rentetarieven genieten, zelfs in een minder litigieuze omgeving zoals Indonesië. Deze bevinding 
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strookt met het idee dat schuldeisers de keuze van een achtenswaardige hoogkwalitatieve auditor 
zien als een signaal van geloofwaardige financiële informatie. 
In de tweede studie wordt onderzocht of de potentiële impact van buitenlandse investeerders en 
bestuursleden op de keuze voor de accountant afhangt van de vraag of deze afkomstig zijn uit een 
ontwikkeld versus uit een ander opkomend land. Deze studie benadrukt dat, in een opkomend land 
als Indonesië, met name eigendom en bestuurslidmaatschap van ontwikkelde buitenlandse landen 
positief geassocieerd is met de selectie van Big4-accountantskantoren. Deze bevinding 
ondersteunt de opvatting dat culturele verschillen verschillende tendensen van auditorkeuze 
beïnvloeden. Buitenlandse investeerders en bestuursleden uit ontwikkelde landen hechten 
waarschijnlijk meer belang aan de zekerheid van Big4-accountantskantoren,die van hoge kwaliteit 
zijn, in vergelijking met buitenlandse investeerders uit opkomende landen. 
De derde studie onderzoekt of de keuze van een bedrijf voor een lokaal auditkantoor dat is 
geafilieerd met een Big4-accountantskantoor in Indonesië van invloed is op zijn kapitaalstructuur. 
De studie documenteert dat bedrijven die zijn gecontroleerd door lokale auditkantoren die zijn 
aangesloten bij een Big4-accountantskantoor, lagere schuldratio's hebben dan die welke zijn 
gecontroleerd door andere auditkantoren. Deze bevinding komt overeen met het idee dat lokale 
accountantskantoren die zijn aangesloten bij een Big4-accountantskantoor een hogere kwaliteit 















One important prerequisite for sustainable economic growth – which is an important goal for 
many emerging countries - is access to finance (Ayyagari, Demirguec-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). Unfortunately, obtaining external financing for companies 
in emerging countries is often hindered by severe information asymmetry (Atkins & Glen, 1992). 
The information asymmetry is partly stemmed from low level of accounting transparency and 
disclosure quality and weak corporate governance (Claessens & Fan, 2002). The quality of 
accounting information might be improved with the application of high quality international 
accounting standards (Barth, Landsman, & Lang, 2008; Barth, Landsman, Young, & Zhuang, 
2014). Many emerging countries have witnessed a transformation to IFRS over the years. 
However, conformity with international accounting standards alone would not be sufficient to 
increase the transparency and accountability of financial information in emerging countries 
because financial information quality also depends on managers and auditors, who involve in the 
preparation of financial statements (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003). 
Auditing is one of the monitoring mechanisms used by companies to reduce agency problems 
between managers and company‟s stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 
1983). By verifying the validity of financial statements and providing assurance that financial 
statements reflect faithfully company‟s underlying economics, auditors play a role as financial 
intermediaries enhancing the credibility of financial information (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & 
Subramanyam, 1998; DeFond & Zhang, 2014), thus reducing information asymmetry. Higher 
quality audit provides more assurance on the credibility of financial statements (DeFond & Zhang, 
2014). Choosing high quality audit could also be considered as a signal that the owners/managers 
genuinely commit to accounting transparency (Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2009). 
3 
 
Since the argument for providing high quality audit depends partly on the strength of litigation, 
most evidence has been observed in developed countries where the litigation is relatively strong. 
Whether the variation of audit quality and the consequences of high quality audit in reducing 
information asymmetry can also be seen in less-litigious emerging countries are worth to be 
examined.   
This dissertation aims to provide evidence on what determine a company choice of a high quality 
audit and what are the consequences of that choice. Study of the auditing role in emerging 
countries context – through their specific institutional features – might shed light on our 
knowledge of the role of auditing in reducing information asymmetry in less-litigious setting. 
Practically, this study is important for several reasons. First, despite the fact that emerging 
countries economic growth rate is high and potentially attract investors‟ interests, companies in 
emerging markets often face severe information asymmetry problems that make external capital is 
relatively costly and less accessible. In such an environment, decreases in information 
asymmetries from increases in the perceived credibility of financial statements could be very 
relevant. The role of financial intermediaries, such as external auditors, and especially their quality 
may be matter. Second, many emerging countries are considered to have weak accounting and 
audit environment that may contribute to the perception of poor transparency and accountability 
and low disclosure quality in their financial information. Empirical evidence on what drives 
companies choosing their external auditor – thus auditor  quality - may open the way on how to 




1.2 Prior Literature 
Prior literature suggests that large audit firms have incentive to provide high quality audit to 
protect their reputation (Beatty, 1989; DeAngelo, 1981; Simunic & Stein, 1987) and to minimize 
litigation risks (Dye, 1993). Reputation protection suggests that large audit firms build their 
reputation by developing perceived competence and independence (Beatty, 1989). The perceived 
competence is built through investing on sophisticated audit technology, human capital and 
knowledge, which allows them to perform higher quality audits whereas the perceived 
independence stems from  their size and large portfolio of clients which give them ability to walk 
away if necessary (Beatty, 1989).  Raman and Wilson (1994) argue that reputation protection is 
important for Big4 audit firms for retaining current clients, attracting new clients, hiring talented 
employees, and obtaining potential non-audit services (Elliot, 1998). The failure to perform high 
quality audit will impair audit firm‟s reputational capital and will damage firm‟s ability to attract 
new client and maintain current clients (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). In international perspective, 
Big4 as international organization, have incentive to maintain their reputation around the world by 
having standard quality control in application of audit methodologies and the recruitment 
mechanism, training, and knowledge sharing practices for their employee (Francis & Wang, 2008; 
Simunic & Stein, 1987). In addition, Magnan (2008)‟s informal survey with large audit firms‟ 
partners reveals the similar conclusion that large international audit firms have relatively uniform 
quality since they maintain standard audit procedures and effort across country and standard 
professional training program.  
The litigation concerns suggests that larger audit firms face a relatively higher risk of litigation 
and larger economic costs in case of litigation, which gives them more incentives to increase audit 
quality. The relatively larger probability of litigation for Big4 audit firms stems from the “deep 
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pockets theory” (Dye, 1993). This means that, if there is a probability that an audited financial 
report contains misstatements that are due to fraud or management error, there is a relatively 
higher chance that large audit firms will be prosecuted by investors for the simple reason that they 
have more financial means. The larger costs in case of litigation are related to the potential loss of 
reputation and brand-related fee premia (DeAngelo, 1981). As a consequence, large audit firms 
have more economic incentives to avoid litigation by performing higher quality audits and may 
therefore provide (or may at least be perceived to provide) higher audit quality.  
There exists mixed result on whether high quality audit (or perceived high quality audit) of Big4 
can be observed in less-litigious environment. Several empirical studies report evidence support 
the view that Big4 audit quality depends on the country legal environment. Khurana and Raman 
(2004), for example, report that large audit firms are associated with a lower cost of equity capital 
in the United States, but not in other less-litigious Anglo-American countries such as Canada, the 
United Kingdom and Australia. They argue that differences in litigation exposure drive perceived 
audit quality. Using larger country sample (42 countries), Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005) 
document evidence that the association between Big4 audit firms and earnings quality is stronger 
for litigious countries than in less-litigious countries. Gul, Zhou, and Zhu (2013) investigate the 
association between Big4 and cost of debt in cross-country setting document consistent result with 
Francis and Wang (2008). Other studies find that the quality of Big4 audit firms are perceived 
even stronger in less litigious environment with high information asymmetry and play a role as 
firm-level governance substitute in a weak governance environment (Choi & Wong, 2007; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Fan & Wong, 2005). Fan and Wong (2005) document that firms 
subject to agency problems imbedded in their ownership structure are more likely to employ Big4 
audit firms for sample of East Asian firms. 
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1.3 Indonesia setting 
Indonesia is one of the emerging countries with the highest economic growth during the last 
decade. The annual growth rate of real GDP is about 5.9% (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri Institute, 
2015). To maintain its growth the country needs to rely on external capital. Similar to other 
emerging countries, Indonesia is also characterized to have weak litigation environment. In 
addition, Indonesian companies are well-known to have issues with weak corporate governance 
and suffer a reputation of low transparency and disclosure quality (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; 
Fan & Wong, 2002), weak investor protection (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) and under-
developed capital markets (Biddle & Hilary, 2006).  
Below are several important elements in the financial system in Indonesia. 
1.3.1 Indonesian accounting and audit environment 
The Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007 requires corporate entities to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with the Indonesian financial accounting standards (SAKs) 
issued by the Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard Board (DSAK) of the Institute of 
Indonesia Chartered Accountants (IAI) (IFAC, 2016). In 2012, as part of the ongoing convergence 
process, the DSAK substantially aligned SAKs with the IASs and IFRSs as they existed in 2009. 
By January 1, 2015, at the end of a second phase of the convergence process, SAKs were 
substantially aligned with IASs and IFRSs as they existed in 2014. 
The financial reports of publicly listed companies should be audited
1
. The Indonesian Institute of 
Public Accountants or IAPI regulates public accountants and is legally empowered to set auditing 
standards (SPAPs) for the public accountancy profession. In 2012, International Standards on 
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Auditing (ISAs) (2010) were adopted. These standards are effective for listed companies for audits 
of financial statements for periods beginnings on or after January, 2013 (IFAC, 2016).  
To pursue auditor profession career, one should through the following steps. Firstly, ones should 
be graduated in accounting from a university and continue their education through Professional 
Accounting Education Program (PPAk)
2
. This step lead to the title of accountant and are eligible 
to be registered in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). In the next step, a registered accountant should 
pass the qualifying exams held by IAPI which permit them to hold a Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA) title. To practice as an auditor (i.e. signing audit reports), a CPA should obtain license from 
the MoF once certain minimum requirements are fulfilled. These requirements are that the 
accountant has passed the CPA exam held by IAPI, has sufficient audit experience, is a member of 
professional association, is domiciled in Indonesia, and has a tax identification number. An auditor 
can open an audit office or joint the existing audit office. To open an audit office, several 
requirements should be met: have a license from the MoF, an office located in Indonesia, a 
quality-control system in place and employ at least two employees who have adequate knowledge 
of accountancy
3
. To be eligible to provide professional audit services to listed firms in the 
Indonesian capital markets, an auditor must also be registered with OJK, an independent 
institution that has the authority to regulate and supervise the financial service sector in Indonesia. 
There are several indicators suggesting serious quality issues within the local Indonesian audit 
context (Dunakhir, 2016). With few exceptions, local audit firms in Indonesia are relatively small 
and capacity-constrained. Due to lack of adequate resources, they face challenges in providing 
high-quality auditing services (The World Bank, 2010a).  Anecdotal evidence from interviews 
with practicing auditors reveals high levels of compliance gaps with respect to audit planning, 
documentation, related party investigation and fraud detection (The World Bank, 2010a). 
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Furthermore, similar to many emerging markets, regulations are not fully enforced (Ball, 2001; 
Chan & Hameed, 2006). This is also found in Indonesia. Cases where companies, shareholders or 
third parties sue public accounting firms are very rare as a result of costly and time consuming 
courts processes, lack of experienced judges and laws and regulations that are perceived to be 
ambiguous (The World Bank, 2010a, 2010b).  Brown, Preiato, and Tarca (2014) classified 
countries based on their audit environment and accounting enforcement and ranked Indonesia as 
46
th
 of 51 countries. 
1.3.2 Foreign audit firms 
During the Dutch colonial era, after Indonesian independence 1945, and up to 1957 (about twelve 
years after independence), Indonesian economy was dominated by Dutch companies and also by 
Dutch accounting and audit firms (Murwanto, Kanna, & Van Zijl, 2011; Reid, 2003). Local 
professional accountant was very rare. The first indigenous Indonesian accountant was graduated 
from Rotterdam in 1932 (Murwanto et al., 2011). The University of Indonesia was the first to open 
accountancy education in 1954 (Murwanto et al., 2011).  The law number 34 of the year 1954 was 
the first regulation that regulate the education system, the certification, and the authority of 
accounting profession. This law stated that one could open audit firm he or she has the accounting 
title and graduate from Indonesian state university that have been certified by the government.  
In 1958, government of Indonesia nationalized all Dutch-owned companies and prohibited trading 
securities issued by Dutch companies in Indonesia. This policy ended Jakarta securities exchange 
and closed all Dutch companies offices in Indonesia including the Dutch accounting and audit 
firms (Bachtiar, 2001; Murwanto et al., 2011). From the period of 1958 to 1967, there was no 
foreign accounting and audit firms operated in Indonesia (Bachtiar, 2001). Nonetheless, local audit 
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firms business was not growing since they only audit state-owned companies as assignment given 
by  Ministry of Finance (Kartikahadi, 2010).  
In 1967, Indonesia began to open the door for foreign investment. The coming of foreign 
investment also brought with them foreign audit firms (Bachtiar, 2001; Irmawan, Haniffa, & 
Hudaib, 2013). This was the period when the foreign audit firms started to enter to Indonesian 
market again. Those which came in the first wave and establish cooperation with local accounting 
firms in the early 1971 were Arthur Young with Santoso Harsokusumo; Sycip, Gorres & Velayo 
with Utomo Jososudirjo; Torquand Young with Go Si Tiem; Price Waterhouse with Tan Eng Oen; 
Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co with Soedjendro & Co; and Coopers & Lybrand with Suparman.   
Since then, the regulation about how foreign audit firms can enter and operate in Indonesia has 
evolved. But basically, foreign audit firms can only enter Indonesian audit markets through 
cooperation with the local firms. According to the regulation (Law Number 5 the year of 2011, 
and also stated in previous regulation Finance Ministry Decree KMK 17/KMK. / 2008) the 
international audit firms partnering with local firms should provide training program, have 
standards on quality control, and perform periodic quality control. Kartikahadi (2010) describes 
that the Big4 audit firms use tight selection and evaluation procedure in choosing their local 
partners. The evaluation of the local business partner covers factors such as the firm‟s compliance 
of professional standards, business plan, the completeness and balance of professional services 
offered, the quality and quantity of professional staffs, organization structure, and office and 
infrastructure. The international audit firms facilitates consulting workshop, annual meeting, and 
quality review among others for their member firms. Informal interview with several employees of 
local firms affiliated with Big4 audit firms reveals that the employee have to follow standard 
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training program in their professional career and apply standard audit procedures in performing 
audits. 
1.3.3 The financing environment 
Indonesian capital markets are still considered underdeveloped. Companies are generally be 
reluctant to go public despite available tax incentives because they perceive that listed companies 
should follow more strict regulatory requirement and provide more disclosure to the public that 
can lead to higher tax obligation (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri Institute, 2015). 
The number of listed companies in equity market is 506 in 2014 (IDX, 2016) with market 
capitalization 47% of GDP (The World Bank, 2016). The percentage of companies that have free 
float above 40% is relatively low in Indonesian equity market (IMF, 2010). The public debt 
market is also underdeveloped. The number of companies that issued bonds is very small since it 
is dominated by government bonds, which represent 70% of the funds raised (IDX & IBPA, 
2014). Equity and bond market liquidity is generally quite low (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri 
Institute, 2015; Rhee & Wang, 2009). Thus, Indonesian companies rely on private debt financing, 
mainly of bank loans when in need of external capital.  
In the aftermath of Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian financial authorities re-regulated the 
banking industry in order to build banking industry as proper intermediation role. Prudential 
regulation for banks were tightened around 2003 and 2004, for example, by increasing the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio from 4% to 8%, lowering the legal lending limit for companies in 
the same group to less than 20% of the total bank assets, and prohibiting dispensation of favors to 
specific companies.  
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Studies find that tight monetary policy and prudential regulation issues after the crisis impact on 
banks unwillingness to supply loan especially to the new borrowers and only willing to extend or 
supply to “good” borrowers (Zulverdi, Gunadi, & Pramono, 2007) and that Indonesian banking is 
not efficient in distributing loans although they are liquid, solvent, and profitable (Rosengard & 
Prasetyantoko, 2011). 
Banks in Indonesia setting can be classified as commercial banks, rural banks, and sharia banks, 
where commercial banks dominates the markets. Four state-owned banks are part of the major 
banks and are included in the top ten based on their total assets. Bank loans are classified into 
three categories according to the usage; working capital loan, investment loan, and consumers loan 
(Defung, 2014). Working capital loans is accounted as the highest proportion of the total bank 
loans, followed by investment and consumption (Defung, 2014). 
 
1.3.4 Ownership structure of Indonesian public listed companies 
Unlike most companies from developed countries which have diffuse ownership, companies in 
emerging countries, including Indonesia, are characterized by highly concentrated ownership in 
public listed (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Family controlled 
is the most significant in numbers (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); Carney and Hamilton-
Hart (2015), followed by foreign entities, and state controlled. Foreign controlling shareholders 
are not only from developed countries but also from other emerging countries. State-owned 
companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange is small in numbers, they consist or several 




1.4 Brief overview of individual article 
The aim of this dissertation is to explore factors that impact the choice for Big4 audit firms and the 
consequences of choosing Big4 audit firms Indonesia. 
The first article examines whether, in Indonesia where litigation is weak and Big4 audit firms can 
only enter the market through affiliation with a local audit firm, the choice for Big4 audit firms 
can be benefited for the clients in terms of lower cost of debt. Financial statements credibility is 
important for lenders to assess borrowers‟ quality (Kim, Song, & Tsui, 2013) and to monitor debt 
contracting (J. R. Booth, 1992). The decrease on information asymmetry from appointing a large 
audit firm reduces perceived risks and monitoring costs which should translate into lower cost of 
debt. We argue that local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm increases the credibility of 
financial statements as perceived by creditors because of several reasons. Firstly, the reputational 
concern of Big4 audit firms provides incentives to standardize audit quality which translate into 
pressure on local firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm to increase audit effort. Secondly, local 
firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm are able to access to expertise and better resources of Big4 
audit firms. Thirdly, Big4 audit firms use tight selection and evaluation procedures in choosing 
their local partners and only team up with better local audit firms (Kartikahadi, 2010). 
The second article investigates the link between foreign involvement, more specifically foreign 
ownership and board membership, and auditor choice. It examines whether the potential impact of 
foreign ownership and board membership on the likelihood of choosing Big4 audit firms depends 
on whether the foreign involvement originates from a developed or an emerging country. Hope, 
Kang, Thomas, and Yoo (2008) suggest that cultural differences drive different tendencies of 
auditor choice. We argue that foreign investors and board members from developed countries 
probably attach more importance on the assurance from high quality Big4 audit firms, as 
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compared to foreign investors from emerging countries. To the best of our knowledge, this article 
is the first to differentiate between developed and emerging countries when considering the effect 
of foreign involvement on auditor choice. 
The third article studies the relationship between the choice of high quality audit firms and 
companies capital structure.  The pecking order theory suggests that equity would be the finance 
source of last resort, after internal finance and debt, as it is the most sensitive to information 
asymmetry (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Follow this idea, prior studies argue that firms characterized 
by higher information asymmetry would be more likely to have higher leverage ratios (Bharath, 
Pasquariello, & Wu, 2009; Petacchi, 2015). As hiring high quality external audit firms – most 
often refers to Big4 audit firms – can enhance the credibility of financial statements thereby 
mitigating information asymmetry problem, companies that choose a Big4 audit firm will be more 
likely to have lower debt ratio (Bharath et al., 2009; Petacchi, 2015). Whether this argument can 
be applied in emerging countries is the central question in the third article. L. Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) suggest that while some of the capital structure theories 
in developed countries are applied to emerging countries, specific institutional features which 
characterize emerging countries might require country-specific evidence. One of the argument on 
why Big4 audit firms provide high quality audit is to minimize litigation risks and costs 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). This prerequisite is barely met in most emerging countries since 
most of them are considered to have low litigation environment and weak investor protection 
(Claessens & Fan, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). To the best of our knowledge, there exist no 
studies that have empirically investigated the relation between auditor choice and capital structure 
in emerging countries. 
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1.5 Data source 
In all articles we apply a regression procedure using non-financial Indonesian listed firms. All 
financial data were retrieved from Worldscope. Since Worldscope only provides data on the 
auditor of the latest year available, we hand-collected the data on the auditors over the years of the 
study through the ICMD. We also hand-collected ownership data from the ICMD in combination 
with data from the annual reports. We used the annual reports to identify membership of the board 
of directors and board of commissioners. We followed the United Nations in classifying 
developed and emerging countries.  
We start our sample from 2008 up to the year available in the database for the analysis. For the 
first article we exploit 1,807 company-year observations of non-financial Indonesian listed 
companies over the 2008 – 2015 time horizon. In the second article extends the period to 2016, 
resulting the final sample of 2,378 observations. The third article exploits 1,977 company-years of 
non-financial Indonesian listed companies between 2008 and 2015.  
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter is the first article that 
examine the relationship between affiliation local audit firms with a Big4 audit firm choice and 
cost of debt. It is followed by the second article that investigates whether foreign ownership and 
board membership country of origin affect the likelihood to choose an affiliated Big4 audit firm. 
The fourth chapter is on the third article which is about the impact of an affiliated Big4 audit firm 
choice on the capital structure of the company. The final chapter concludes this dissertation and 
provides the major findings and contributions together with some practical implications, 
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 Notes
                                                     
 
1
 The requirement of audited financial statements are regulated in the Limited Liability Company Law and 
the Capital Market Law.  
2
 PPAk is a one-year program for individuals who wish to enter the accounting profession. This program is 
run by accredited universities and under supervision of the Ministry of the higher education.  
3
 The smallest audit firm needs at least three persons, one chief/partner that holds a registered public 
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This paper documents that in Indonesia, where litigation risk is low and Big4 audit firms can only 
enter the market through affiliation with a local audit firm, the appointment of a Big4-affiliated 
local audit firm reduces the cost of debt for listed companies significantly. This effect turns out to 
be stronger for companies with a higher risk profile. We also find that the appointment of a local  
audit firm that is affiliated with a second-tier audit firm has a similar effect on the cost of debt. 
The appointment of a local audit firm that is affiliated with an international audit firm other than a 
Big4 or second-tier firm seems to have no effect. This evidence is in line with the idea that Big4 
audit firms are perceived as applying uniform quality criteria around the world, regardless of the 
local circumstances in which they operate. 
 
Keywords: audit quality, Big4, cost of debt, emerging market, Indonesia.  





This paper investigates whether the affiliation of local Indonesian audit firms with one of the Big4 
reduces the cost of debt for listed companies in Indonesia. Foreign audit firms are allowed to enter 
the Indonesian audit market but can only do so by partnering with a local audit firm. There are 
several indicators suggesting serious quality issues within the local Indonesian audit context 
(Dunakhir, 2016). With few exceptions, local audit firms in Indonesia are relatively small and 
capacity-constrained. Due to lack of adequate resources, they face challenges in providing high-
quality auditing services (The World Bank, 2010a).  Anecdotal evidence from interviews with 
practicing auditors reveals high levels of compliance gaps with respect to audit planning, 
documentation, related party investigation and fraud detection (The World Bank, 2010a).  
We hypothesize that the affiliation of local audit firms with a Big4 firm reduces the cost of debt 
for the client. Our argumentation is based on the idea that cooperation of a local audit firm with a 
Big4 increases the quality of the audit as perceived by the creditors. International Big4 firms are 
widely viewed as producing higher quality audits than non-Big4 firms (Francis, Maydew & 
Sparks, 1999). One of the reasons is that the brand name reputation of the Big4 audit firms 
provides them with an incentive to increase their audit effort. When a local Indonesian audit firm 
affiliates with a Big4 audit firm to perform the audit of an Indonesian company, we expect that the 
reputational concerns of the Big4 firm will translate into pressure on the local audit firm to 
increase its efforts. A second reason why Big4 firms are viewed as producing higher audit quality 
is that they have more and better resources (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). We argue that through 
affiliation, local Indonesian audit firms can expand their access to expertise and tap into the 
resources of the well-equipped and more sophisticated Big4 firms. The transfer of professionalism 
is even embedded in the Indonesian regulation, according to which an international audit firm 
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partnering with a local audit firm should provide training programs, impose standards on quality 
control and perform periodic quality controls. Another reason that creditors may perceive audit 
services performed by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 firm as being of higher quality is that 
there is evidence that Big4 firms use tight selection and evaluation procedures in choosing their 
local partners (Kartikahadi, 2010) and only team up with the better local audit firms. Collectively, 
these arguments suggest that local audit firms that are affiliated with a Big4 provide higher quality 
audits compared to other audit firms. Lenders typically rely on the financial statements to assess 
borrower quality (Kim, Song, & Tsui, 2013).  
Based on the argumentation above, we argue that lenders perceive financial statements of 
borrowers that are audited by a local Indonesian audit firm that is affiliated with a Big4 firm as 
being of higher quality, hereby strengthening their beliefs regarding the accuracy of their 
assessment of borrowers‟ credit risk and their perceived efficiency of lender monitoring (Booth, 
1992). We expect that this will be translated in a lower cost of debt.  
We test our hypothesis on a sample of Indonesian listed companies between 2008 and 2015. We 
regress these companies‟ cost of debt on a dummy variable indicating whether or not the local 
Indonesian audit firm is affiliated with a Big4 audit firm and various control variables, including 
interest coverage, profitability, leverage, asset tangibility, size, the occurrence of negative equity, 
age, growth and cash flow performance. In line with prior studies (J. Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & 
Schipper, 2005; Minnis, 2011; Vander Bauwhede, De Meyere, & Van Cauwenberge, 2015), we 
proxy the cost of debt by the effective interest cost, i.e. the ratio of the interest expense to the 
average amount of financial debt.  
Endogeneity concerns stemming from auditor self-selection might yield inconsistent coefficient 
estimates when estimating the model using ordinary least squares estimation (Heckman, 1976, 
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1978). To address this concern, we estimate a so-called Heckman treatment effect regression, 
which is a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) using full maximum likelihood (Greene, 
2000; Maddala, 1983). We model auditor choice as a function of firm-specific variables that have 
appeared in previous literature (Chaney, Jeter, & Shivakumar, 2004; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2014) and variables that reflect unique features of the 
Indonesian setting that are likely to impact auditor choice. This selection model is estimated 
simultaneously with the main regression model.  
Our findings are the following. First of all, the Wald test confirms that endogeneity is indeed a 
relevant concern and that straightforward application of ordinary least squares would have been 
inappropriate. Taking into account the endogeneity concern with the Heckman treatment effect 
approach, we find that hiring a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 is associated with a lower 
cost of debt. This negative association is not only statistically significant but also economically 
relevant. The decrease from affiliation with a Big4 firm in cost of debt is 4.8 percentage points. 
In a second instance, we investigate whether affiliation with a second-tier or another international 
audit firm also has an effect on the cost of debt. While we observe in our sample that a significant 
percentage of the audits was performed by audit firms affiliated with a Big4 (38%), an even bigger 
percentage (49.81%) was performed by auditors partnering with an international audit firm other 
than a Big4. More in particular, 9.96% of the audits were performed by second-tier international 
partner audit firms, while in 39,85% of the case, the partners were other international audit firms. 
Substituting the Big4 variable with an ordered categorical variable that can include four 
categories: Big4, second-tier, other international and local audit firms, we find not only that the 
effect of Big4 remains, but also that the affiliation with a second-tier audit firm has a negative 
24 
 
effect which is of approximately the same size as the effect of Big4. For the affiliation of an audit 
firm with other international audit firms, we find no significant effect.  
Next, we investigate whether the relation between the affiliation of an audit firm with a Big4 audit 
firm and the effective interest cost varies with firm characteristics. For lenders, the additional 
assurance provided by an audit firm that is affiliated with a Big4 audit firm compared to a non-
affiliated audit firm might be more pertinent for high risk borrowers. We define subsamples of 
high versus low risk borrowers partitioned on the median of the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) 
and the level of debt respectively. Our results show that the negative relation between affiliation 
with Big4 auditors and the cost of debt cost is only present in the high risk subsample, regardless 
of how risk is defined.  
Our work has contributions both from a theoretical and a practical point of view. First of all, our 
results are relevant from the point of view of managers, who are concerned about their cost of 
capital in general and the cost of debt in particular (Gul, Zhou, & Zhu, 2013). Our results show 
that in Indonesia, the appointment of a local audit firm that is affiliated with a Big4 or second-tier 
international audit firm is valued by lenders and has a negative effect on the cost of debt which is 
economically significant. For the country as a whole, external financing is vital to boost economic 
growth (Atkins & Glen, 1992) and debt is the main source of finance even for listed companies 
(Patrick, 2002). In the aftermath of Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian financial authorities 
tightened the prudential regulations in order to strengthen the banking industry. In response, the 
Indonesian banking industry expressed risk averse behaviour supplying finance only to well-
known borrowers and denying funds to new or more risky borrowers (Rosengard & 
Prasetyantoko, 2011; Zulverdi, Gunadi, & Pramono, 2007). In such an environment, decreases in 
information asymmetries from increases in the perceived credibility of financial statements could 
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be very relevant. Our research shows that this effect turns out to be even stronger for more risky 
companies.  
From a theoretical point of view, our findings are related to and add to other work that 
investigated the economic consequences of the appointment of large international audit firms. For 
example, an international study by (Gul et al., 2013) – which does not include Indonesia – shows 
that the appointment of a Big4 auditor decreases the cost of debt especially in countries with high 
litigation risk and to a lesser extent in low ligation risk countries. Our study indicates that in a 
country with low litigation risk like Indonesia, the reduction in the cost of debt can be of economic 
importance. Furthermore, this reduction exists even when the large international firm can only 
enter the market through affiliation with a local firm that performs the audit. 
In our opinion, the fact that the appointment of a Big4-affiliated audit firm is valued in a low 
litigious environment may stem from the fact that large international audit firms apply relatively 
uniform standard audit procedures, training program and efforts across countries (Magnan, 2008) 
and care about their relatively high potential worldwide reputational loss wherever in the world 
misreporting is revealed. The magnitude of the effect that we found on the costs of debt can 
probably be attributed in part to the weakness of the Indonesian local audit environment, where 
the affiliation with a big international audit firm sends a relatively stronger signal to the lenders 
about the credibility of the financial statements than in other countries.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background on the 
Indonesian auditing and financial setting. Section three provides a literature review and develops 
our hypothesis. Next, we present our sample selection, descriptive statistics and empirical 
findings. The last section concludes. 
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2.2 The Indonesia setting 
2.2.1 The local accounting and audit environment 
The Limited Liability Company Law of 2007 requires corporate entities to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with the Indonesian financial accounting standards (SAKs) as issued by 
the Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard Board (DSAK) of the Institute of Indonesia 
Chartered Accountants (IAI) (IFAC, 2016). In 2012, as part of an ongoing convergence process, 
the DSAK substantially aligned SAKs with the IASs and IFRSs as they existed in 2009. By 
January 2015, at the end of a second phase of the convergence process, SAKs were substantially 
aligned with IASs and IFRSs as they existed in 2014. 
The financial reports of publicly listed companies should be audited. The Indonesian Institute of 
Public Accountants or IAPI regulates the audit profession and is legally empowered to set auditing 
standards (SPAPs). In 2012, the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) were adopted. These 
standards are effective for audits of financial statements of listed companies for periods beginning 
on or after January, 2013 (IFAC, 2016).  
To pursue an audit profession career, there are several conditions that need to be fulfilled. First, a 
university graduate should pass the Professional Accounting Education Program (PPAk)
1
 to obtain 
the title of accountant and should register in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Next, a registered 
accountant has to obtain a license from the MoF to practice as an auditor but can only do so once 
certain minimum requirements are satisfied.  These requirements are that the accountant has 
passed the CPA exam held by IAPI, has sufficient audit experience, is a member of a professional 
association, is domiciled in Indonesia, and has a tax identification number. An auditor can open an 
audit office or join an existing audit office. To open an audit office, several requirements have to 
be met: a license from the MoF, an office located in Indonesia,  the application of a quality-control 
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system and the employment at least two employees who have adequate knowledge of 
accountancy
2
. To provide professional audit services to listed firms in the Indonesian capital 
markets, an auditor must also be registered with OJK, an independent institution that has the 
authority to regulate and supervise the financial service sector in Indonesia. In 2010, there were 
424 MoF–registered audit firms which are eligible to perform assurance service in Indonesia. 168 
of them are eligible to perform audit service to listed companies (The World Bank, 2010a).  
There are several indicators suggesting that there are serious quality issues within the local 
Indonesian accounting and audit context (Dunakhir, 2016). With few exceptions, most audit firms 
in Indonesia are relatively small (The World Bank, 2010a). Many firms are audited by capacity-
constrained audit firms. The local audit firms, due to lack of adequate resources, face challenges in 
providing high-quality auditing services for entities with complex business transactions. Figures 
from the World Bank (The World Bank, 2010a) show that the majority of OJK registered audit 
firms have only one registered public accountant. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with 
practicing auditors revealed high levels of compliance gaps with respect to audit planning, 
documentation, related party investigation and fraud detection (The World Bank, 2010a). 
Membership of the IAI is not mandatory for preparers of financial statements and auditors, and the 
majority of registered accountants did not apply for IAI membership. Consequently, this majority 
is excluded from the professional training programs that the IAI organizes, which is not beneficial 
for quality improvement (The World Bank, 2010a).  
Furthermore, similar to many emerging markets, regulations are not fully enforced (Ball, 2001; 
Chan & Hameed, 2006). This is also found in Indonesia. Cases where companies, shareholders or 
third parties sue public accounting firms are very rare as a result of costly and time consuming 
courts processes, lack of experienced judges and laws and regulations that are perceived to be 
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ambiguous (The World Bank, 2010a, 2010b).  Brown, Preiato, and Tarca (2014) classified 
countries based on their audit environment and accounting enforcement and ranked Indonesia as 
46
th
 of 51 countries. 
2.2.2 Foreign audit firms 
During the Dutch colonial era, and up to a decade after the declaration of independence in 1945, 
the Indonesian economy was dominated by Dutch companies. Also the accounting firms were 
Dutch and the local accountant profession was almost nonexistent (Murwanto, Kanna, & Van Zijl, 
2011; Reid, 2003). In 1958, the Indonesian government nationalized all Dutch-owned companies 
and prohibited trading securities issued by Dutch companies in Indonesia. Consequently, all Dutch 
accounting firms closed their offices in Indonesia (Bachtiar, 2001; Murwanto et al., 2011). During 
the period 1958 to 1967, there were no foreign accounting firms operating in Indonesia (Bachtiar, 
2001). At that time audit requirements were restricted to state-owned companies (Kartikahadi, 
2010).  
Since 1967, Indonesia opened up its financial market to attract foreign investment, which heralded 
the re-entry of foreign audit firms (Bachtiar, 2001; Irmawan, Haniffa, & Hudaib, 2013). However, 
foreign audit firms are not allowed to open their own offices and can only enter the Indonesian 
audit market through cooperation with a local audit firm (Rosser, 1999). According to Indonesian 
regulation, an international audit firm partnering with a local firm should provide training 
programs, impose standards on quality control, and perform periodic quality controls. Kartikahadi 
(2010) describes that the Big4 audit firms use tight selection and evaluation procedures in 
choosing their local partners. The evaluation of a local business partner covers factors such as the 
firm‟s compliance with professional standards, its business plan, the completeness of the 
professional services offered, the quantity and quality of the professional staff, the organization 
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structure and the infrastructure. The affiliating international auditor is required to organize 
consulting workshops, annual meetings and quality reviews for its local partners. 
2.2.3 The financing environment 
Indonesia‟s capital markets are still relatively underdeveloped (Rhee & Wang, 2009). Companies 
are generally reluctant to go public as the higher regulatory requirements for listed companies 
involve more disclosure obligations (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri Institute, 2015). The public debt 
market is also limited. The number of companies that issue bonds is very small and the bond 
market is dominated by government issues, which represent 70% of the funds raised (IDX & 
IBPA, 2014). Equity and bond market liquidity is generally quite low (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri 
Institute, 2015; Rhee & Wang, 2009). Consequently, Indonesian companies depend to a large 
extent on bank financing.  
Banks in Indonesia can be classified as either commercial banks, rural banks or sharia banks, the 
former being the largest. Bank loans are classified into three categories according to the usage: 
working capital loans, investment loans, and consumers loans (Defung, 2014). Working capital 
loans account for the highest proportion of the total bank loans,  followed by investment and 
consumption loans (Defung, 2014). 
In the aftermath of Asian financial crisis, the Indonesian financial authorities tightened the 
prudential regulations in order to strengthen the banking industry. In response, Indonesian banks 
expressed risk averse behaviour supplying finance only to well-known borrowers and denying 
funds to new or more risky borrowers (Rosengard & Prasetyantoko, 2011; Zulverdi et al., 2007). 
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2.3 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Large auditors are generally expected to have stronger incentives and greater competencies to 
provide high audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). Audits of higher quality provide more assurance on 
the credibility of the financial statements (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). Lenders typically rely on 
these statements to assess borrower quality (Kim et al., 2013) and to monitor debt contracting 
(Booth, 1992). The decrease in perceived information asymmetry from appointing a large audit 
firm reduces perceived risks and monitoring costs which should translate into to lower interest 
rates.  
A number of empirical studies has already provided evidence of this relation. Pittman and Fortin 
(2004) and Causholli and Knechel (2012) investigate US IPO‟s and find that retaining a big 
auditor enables firms to lower their borrowing cost. Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller (2004) show that 
audit firm size is negatively related to the return for a sample of US corporate bonds. Using a large 
sample of U.S. bank loan data, (Kim et al., 2013) find that the loan interest rate is significantly 
lower for borrowers with Big4 auditors. The theoretical argumentation for the relation between 
audit size and quality in these studies depends in part on litigation. In a litigious environment, 
larger audit firms face a relatively higher risk of litigation and larger economic costs in case of 
litigation (DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993), which gives them more incentives to increase audit 
quality. As the above evidence was gathered in a high litigation risk environment, it leaves the 
question unanswered about the existence and strength of a relationship between auditor size and 
the cost of debt in less litigious environments. An international study – which does not include 
Indonesia – by Gul et al. (2013) provides some insight into this matter. They show that the 
appointment of a Big4 audit firm decreases the cost of debt especially in countries with high 
litigation risk and to a lesser extent in low ligation risk countries.  
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Weak litigation also characterizes the Indonesian audit environment. Indonesian cases where 
companies, shareholders, or third parties sued auditing firms related to professional liability in the 
court are very rare (The Worldbank, 2010a). Therefore, the issue of whether the affiliation of a 
local audit firm with a Big4 firm in a country like Indonesia reduces the cost of debt is not 
straightforward. We argue however that even in such an environment audits by local companies 
affiliated with Big4 audit firms can be perceived as being of higher quality. The underlying 
rationale is that Big4 audit firms have incentives to increase their audit effort in order to protect 
their reputation. Moreover, Big4 audit firms have incentives to maintain this reputation around the 
world by applying standard quality procedures for audit methodologies, recruitment mechanisms, 
training, and knowledge sharing practices for their employee (J. R. Francis & Wang, 2008; 
Simunic & Stein, 1987). Most Big4 firms have active staff exchange programs between countries, 
which stimulate international homogeneity between staff members. In addition, Magnan (2008) 
finds in an informal survey with audit partners of four large audit firms that, for all countries in 
which they are involved, and for all audit engagements, International Auditing Standards are the 
minimum criterion. This implies that Big4 firms‟ values, professional standards, and training 
programs probably override country differences in educational backgrounds and that the level of 
audit effort is likely quite similar across countries, irrespective of legal regime differences. For 
Indonesia, this implies that the reputational concerns of the Big4 will translate into pressure on the 
local affiliated audit firm to increase its efforts. 
A second reason why Big4 affiliated audit firms can be perceived as producing higher quality is 
that Big4 audit firms have more and better resources (DeFond & Zhang, 2014) and that through 
affiliation with such a firm, local Indonesian audit firms can expand their expertise and tap into the 
resources of these firms. The transfer of professionalism is even embedded in the Indonesian 
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regulation, according to which an international audit firm partnering with a local firm should 
provide training programs, impose standards on quality control and perform periodic quality 
controls. 
Another reason that creditors may perceive audit services performed by local firms that are 
affiliated with Big4 firms as being of higher quality is that there is evidence that the international 
audit firms use tight selection and evaluation procedures in choosing their local partners 
(Kartikahadi, 2010) and only team up with the better local audit firms. 
In conclusion, notwithstanding that litigation risk in Indonesia is low, there are various reasons to 
belief that creditors perceive audit services provided by Big4-affiliated local firms as being of 
higher quality. Moreover, that there are serious quality issues within the local Indonesian 
accounting and audit context (Dunakhir, 2016), creditors may attach special value to higher 
quality audit services. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H: Indonesian companies with a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm have a 
lower cost of debt than companies audited by another audit firm.  
2.4 Research design and data collection 
2.4.1 Research design 





        
                                                   
                                               
                                                       
                                                    
 
In line with prior empirical studies (J. Francis et al., 2005; Minnis, 2011; Vander Bauwhede et al., 
2015) we measure the cost of debt (COD) as the ratio of a company‟s interest expense over the 
average amount of financial debt over the year. We use the one-year ahead value in order to 
mitigate the concern stemming from the staleness of the cost of debt variable (Minnis, 2011). 
BIG4 is a dummy variable indicating whether the local audit firm that performed the audit was 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm.  
In accordance with the empirical literature (J. Francis et al., 2005; Kim, Simunic, Stein, & Yi, 
2011; Minnis, 2011; Vander Bauwhede et al., 2015), we include the following control variables: 
interest coverage, profitability, leverage, asset tangibility, size, the occurrence of negative equity, 
age, growth and cash flow performance. Interest coverage (ICOV) is calculated as operating 
income divided by interest expense. Higher values of interest coverage imply less financial risk, so 
a negative coefficient on this variable is expected. Profitability (PROF) is measured as earnings 
before interest and taxes scaled by total assets. More profitable companies are better able to 
service their debt, thus, lenders are likely to charge lower interest rates (Kim et al., 2011). 
Leverage (LEV) is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets. As companies with higher 
leverage have higher financial risk, they are expected to pay higher interest rates. Based on this 
argument, a positive coefficient is expected. Some studies however (Beatty, Ramesh, & Weber, 
2002; J. Francis et al., 2005; Minnis, 2011) argue that companies which are offered attractive 
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interest rates borrow larger amounts, which would imply a negative association between leverage 
and cost of debt. Asset tangibility (TANGIB) is measured as net property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. It is a measure of a company‟s ability to repay outstanding debt in the 
event of default (Minnis, 2011). Higher values correspond to less financial risk, so a negative 
coefficient on this variable is expected. SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Larger companies are viewed as having a better reputation and less information asymmetry 
(Berger & Udell, 1995). Hence, a negative association is expected. Negative equity (NEGEQ) is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if total liabilities exceed total assets and is zero 
otherwise. As negative equity indicates poor performance in the past, it signifies higher risk. 
Therefore a positive coefficient on this variable is expected. AGE is measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the difference between the year t and the year of incorporation. Older 
companies have established relationships with their lenders and have developed a reputation. On 
the other hand, relationship lending potentially allows lenders to exploit monopolistic information 
and charge higher interest rates. Growth (GROW) is calculated as the year-over-year percentage 
growth in sales. Companies with higher growth opportunities are viewed to have higher expected 
costs of financial distress and so a positive coefficient on this variable is expected (Garcia-Teruel, 
Martinez-Solano, & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010). Cash flow performance (CFPERF) is computed as 
cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. Companies that generate strong cash flows are 
perceived to have lower financial risk as they are more able to meet their debt obligations which 
suggests a negative association between this variable and the cost of debt (Anderson, Mansi, & 
Reeb, 2003). However, companies with higher interest rates are expected to generate higher cash 
flows as more debt puts pressure on companies to generate enough cash flow to meet obligations 
and avoid default (Hernandez-Canovas & Martinez-Solano, 2010). The latter reasoning would 
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lead to a positive association. Finally, we include a vector of industry dummies and time dummies 
to control for industry and time effects. The largest industry, consumer goods, and the earliest 
year, 2008, serve as the base categories. 
Prior research has argued that auditor choice by companies is non-random and related to company 
characteristics. Furthermore, audit firms themselves decide whether they will accept or reject 
clients (Eshleman & Guo, 2014). Big4 firms might avoid low-quality or high-risk clients (DeFond, 
Erkens, & Zhang, 2017; Johnstone, 2000; Johnstone & Bedard, 2004) to minimize litigation and 
reputation risk. Given the endogenous nature of auditor choice, estimating equation (1) using 
ordinary least squares may result in inconsistent coefficient estimates (Heckman, 1976, 1978). In 
order to control for this problem, we estimate a  so-called Heckman treatment effect regression, 
which is a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979), using the full maximum likelihood method 
(Greene, 2000; Maddala, 1983) as suggested by Peel (2014). In a first instance, we model auditor 
choice as a function of both firm-specific variables that have been used in previous literature 
(Chaney et al., 2004; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; Guedhami et al., 2014) and 
variables that reflect the unique features of the Indonesian setting.  
More specifically, our auditor selection model specification is as follow: 
 
                                                                     
                                                                




Equation (1) and equation (2) are run simultaneously using the maximum likelihood version of the 
Heckman treatment effect model.  
In the selection regression the dependent variable is BIG4. To take into account the effect of 
foreign ownership, we create a dummy variable FOREIGN, which takes the value of 1 if the 
largest shareholder is  a foreign company. Companies from foreign countries demand higher 
financial reporting quality (He, Rui, Zheng, & Zhu, 2014). Firms are expected to respond to this 
demand by appointing a Big4 audit firm. 
The variables OWN, CROSS and STATE are intended to capture the influence of agency conflicts 
on audit demand. OWN stands for concentrated ownership and is calculated as the percentage of 
closely held shares, i.e. shares by insiders, as defined in Worldscope. Highly concentrated 
ownership creates agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders (Fan & Wong, 
2005). Big4 audit firms can serve as a signal to mitigate agency conflicts (Choi & Wong, 2007). 
Fan and Wong (2005) document that high ownership concentration firms are more likely to 
choose Big4 audit firms. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient on this variable. CROSS is a 
dummy variable indicating that a company is cross-listed in US. Previous literature (Fan & Wong, 
2005; Guedhami et al., 2014) suggests that cross-listing may affect the company‟s choice for a 
Big4 audit firm. Again, we expect a positive sign on this coefficient. STATE is a dummy variable 
indicating that a company is state-owned. Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2011) argue that state-
owned companies are less likely to choose high quality auditors since audit quality plays less of a 
role in constraining earnings management in those companies. Accordingly, we expect a negative 
sign for this coefficient.  
The audit effort is proxied by SIZE, ATURN and CURR. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm 
of total assets while ATURN is calculated as the proportion of total sales to total assets. SIZE and 
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ATURN proxy for the size and the level of economic activity of the company respectively and are 
expected to indicate the level of audit effort to achieve a sufficient level of assurance (Choi & 
Wong, 2007; J. R. Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; Piot, 2001; Simunic & Stein, 1996). 
Following Chaney et al. (2004), we also include the ratio of current asset to total assets (CURR) in 
the regression due to the complexities of inventory and receivables which may require specific 
audit procedures. We expect a positive coefficient on all three variables.   
To control for financial risk, we use LLEV, LLOSS and ROA. LLEV is measured as long term debt 
scaled by total assets. LLOSS is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of negative net 
income before extra items in the previous year. LLEV and LLOSS are associated with the 
probability of a client‟s financial distress which is related to audit risk (Choi & Wong, 2007). 
Hence, a negative relation is expected. However, LLEV also captures potential agency conflicts. 
Chaney et al. (2004) argue that highly leveraged firms may prefer to hire high quality auditors to 
reduce agency costs. Therefore, the direction of LLEV is unclear. Regarding ROA, previous studies 
(Chaney et al., 2004; Guedhami & Pittman, 2011) suggest that auditor choice might be influenced 
by a firm‟s profitability. We expect a positive coefficient of ROA since more profitable firms tend 
to have less audit risk. The variable definitions is presented on Table 2.1 
[Insert Table 2.1 about here] 
 
2.4.2 Data collection 
Except for the Big4 dummy, all data were retrieved from Worldscope. Since Worldscope only 
provides data on the auditor of the latest year available, we hand-collected the data on audit firm 
over the years of the study from the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD).  
38 
 
Table 2.2 summarizes our sample selection process. We began with the set of Indonesian listed 
non-financial companies that existed between 2008 and 2015. Initially, we have 2,573 company-
years of observations. From the initial sample, we excluded companies that experienced an asset 
growth rate of more than 100 percent in any year (64 company-years)
3
, as the latter is an 
indication of significant restructuring activities (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010). Further, to 
guarantee independent observations, we excluded subsidiary companies when the parent company 
was included in our sample (138 company-years).  Companies without debt were excluded (15 
company-years). Finally, we dropped 549 company-years for which there were missing values. 
This resulted in a final sample of 1,807 company-years (315 unique companies) over the 2008 – 
2015 period. 
[Insert Table 2.2 about here] 
Table 2.3 provides a breakdown of the sample by year, industry and age. From this table, it is clear 
that between our sample and the initial sample, there are no problems with respect to over- or 
underrepresentation of certain years, sectors or ages.   
[Insert Table 2.3 about here] 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.4, Panels A and B presents the descriptive statistics of the variables for our complete 
sample and for the sample partitioned by whether a company was audited by a local audit firm 
affiliated with a Big4 or not (Big4 vs. non-Big4) respectively. We winsorized all continuous 




 percentiles. Table 2.4, Panel A shows that the cost of debt is on 




 percentile values for cost of debt are 2.76% and 14,73% 
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respectively. For comparison, the average corporate credit prime rate from the Bank of Indonesia 
for the period of 2011 to 2015 ranged between 6% and 14.70%. Leverage in on average about 
31%, indicating the importance of debt financing for the companies in our sample. 
From Table 4, Panel 2.A, we can also infer that the percentage of audits that were performed by 
local audit firms affiliated with Big4 audit firms is around 38%. This percentage is quite stable 
over time. The lowest percentage is in 2008 (37.57%) and the highest is in 2012 (39.58%) (not 
reported). It is worth noting that the number of companies using Big4 audit firms in Indonesia is 
relatively low compared to other countries. J. R. Francis, Michas, and Seavey (2013), for example, 
report that the percentages of firms audited by Big4 audit firms for the United States, Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia are 61%, 71%,  50%, 72% and 53% respectively.  
In Table 2.4, Panel B, we present the descriptive statistics for the sample partitioned on Big4 
affiliation. With respect to our research hypothesis, firms audited by a local audit firm affiliated 
with a Big4 firm seem to have a lower cost of debt, higher interest coverage and profitability. 
Also, they are larger in size, less likely to have negative equity and older. Further, they display 
higher cash flow performance.  
[Insert Table 2.4 about here] 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations are presented in Table 2.5. Consistent with our 
expectation, BIG4 is negatively related to the cost of debt (COD). Concerning the control 
variables, LEV, TANGIB, SIZE and NEGEQ  are negatively correlated with the cost of debt while 
PROF is positively correlated.  
[Insert Table 2.5 about here] 
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2.5.2 Regression analysis 
Table 2.6 presents the regression results. First of all, the Wald test shows that the endogeneity 
problem is indeed a relevant concern. After taking into account the endogeneity problem using the 
treatment regression, we find that the coefficients of ICOV and LEV are significantly negative. 
The negative coefficient of ICOV indicates that companies having higher interest coverage, 
represent less financial risk, which translates into lower costs of debt. The negative coefficient of 
LEV is consistent with the idea that companies which are offered lower interest rates borrow larger 
amounts (Beatty et al., 2002; J. Francis et al., 2005; Minnis, 2011). NEGEQ is significantly 
positive. This is consistent with the expectation that firms with negative equity bear more financial 
risk, which translates into a higher cost of debt financing.  Contrary to our expectation, the 
coefficient of PROF turns out to be significantly positive. Other control variables turn out to be 
insignificant. Regarding our variable of interest, we find that appointment of a local audit firm 
affiliated with a Big4 auditor is associated with a significantly lower cost of debt. This association 
is also economically relevant. On average, the reduction in the cost of debt for a client firm that is 
audited by an Indonesian local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 firm is around 4.8 percentage 
points. 
[Insert Table 2.6 about here] 
2.5.3 Additional Analyses 
Some additional tests were run to check the robustness of our result. Firstly, while we observed in 
our sample that a significant percentage of audits was performed by a Big4-affiliated audit firm 
(38%), an even bigger percentage (49.8%) was performed by audit firms partnering with an 
international audit firm other than one of the Big4 audit firms. More in particular, Table 2.4, Panel 
A shows that 9.96% of the firms were audited by local audit firms affiliated with second-tier 
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international audit firms and 39.85% by local audit firms affiliated with other (non-Big4, non-
second-tier) international audit firms. Therefore, we are interested to find out whether an effect of 
international audit affiliation – other than with Big4 firms – also exists. We follow Hogan & 
Martin (2009) in defining second-tier audit firms and detect Grant Thornton, Crowe, and BDO 
Seidman as international second-tier audit firms that have affiliations with local Indonesian audit 
firms.  The category „other‟ international auditors was defined as the residual category, i.e. local 
auditors affiliated with international auditors that are not Big4 and not second-tier. We run a 
Heckman treatment effect model with an endogenous ordered categorical variable.  We substitute 
the BIG4 variable with a newly created ordered categorical variable (AUD) that is ordered as 
follows: the base level category represents companies audited by local audit firms that are not 
affiliated with an international audit firm, the next category is INTL, that represents those audited 
by a local audit firm affiliated with an international audit firm other than a second-tier or Big4 
firm, followed by 2NDTIER that represents those audited by local audit firms affiliated with an 
international second-tier audit firm and the final category, BIG4, represents local audit firms 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm. The results of the estimation of the Heckman treatment effect 
regression using an endogenous categorical ordered variable are presented in Table 2.7, Panel A. 
The coefficients of the control variables of the treatment regression are relatively similar to those 
in the main regression (see Table 2.6). The coefficient of INTL turns out to be insignificant, 
indicating that the appointment of a local audit firm affiliated with an international audit firm other 
than a second-tier or Big4 firm is not associated with a significantly lower interest rate. The 
coefficients of BIG4 and 2NDTIER however are both negative and significant. This indicates that 
companies that choose a local audit firm affiliated with an international reputable audit firms 
(either a Big4 or a second-tier) tend to have a significantly lower cost of debt.  
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Secondly, we investigate whether the relation between the affiliation of an audit firm with a Big4 
audit firm and the cost of debt varies with firm characteristics. For lenders, the additional 
assurance provided by an audit firm that is affiliated with a Big4 audit firm might be more 
pertinent for high risk borrowers. We define subsamples of high versus low risk borrowers 
partitioned on the median of the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) and the level of debt respectively. 
We calculate the Z-score and divide our sample into two groups based on the median of this score. 
Lower values for the Altman Z-score indicate higher risk companies. Similarly, we divide our 
sample into two groups based on the median of leverage. Observation with a higher than median 
leverage have a higher risk profile. For each group of high and low risk, we rerun our treatment 
effect regression. Table 2.7, Panel B shows the regression results. The impact of Big4 audit firms 
is significantly negative for the high risk subsample but less significant for the low risk 
subsamples. These results indicate that the effect of an affiliation of a local Indonesian audit firm 
with a Big4 on the cost of debt is more outspoken for companies of relatively higher risk. 
[Insert Table 2.7 about here] 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper documents that in Indonesia, where litigation risk is low and Big4 audit firms can only 
enter the market through affiliation with a local audit firm, the appointment of a Big4-affiliated 
local audit firm reduces the cost of debt of listed companies significantly. This effect turns out to 
be stronger for companies with a higher risk profile, as measured by the Altman Z-score and the 
level of debt. We also find that the appointment of an audit firm that is affiliated with a second-tier 
audit firm has a similar effect on the cost of debt. The appointment of an audit firm that is 
affiliated with an international audit firm other than a Big4 or second-tier firm seems to have no 
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effect. The economic magnitude of the appointment of a Big4-affiliated audit firm is quite 
significant, i.e. a reduction in the cost of debt with 4.8 percentage points. Our conclusions are 
robust to endogeneity concerns stemming from auditor choice.  
These findings have practical relevance for managers of Indonesian companies as they are highly 
dependent on debt financing and the Indonesian banking industry expresses risk averse behaviour. 
As a consequence of tight prudential regulations that were established in the aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis, the banking industry supplies finance only to well-known borrowers and 
denies funds to new or more risky borrowers. Our findings suggest that auditor choice plays an 
important role in providing assurance on the credibility of the financial statements, which may 
help in the further development of the Indonesian credit market. 
From a theoretical point of view, our findings are relevant as they demonstrate that even in a low 
litigious environment like Indonesia, Big4 auditors are perceived to improve audit quality. This 
evidence is in line with the idea that Big4 audit firms apply uniform quality criteria around the 
world, regardless of the local circumstances in which they operate. The specific nature of the 
Indonesian context, where foreign auditors are forbidden to enter the audit market directly, allows 
us to draw the conclusion that even affiliation of a local audit firm with a Big4 audit firm is 
sufficient to generate this positive effect on the cost of debt.  
This study uses firm-level instead of loan-level data to assess the cost of debt. An advantage of 
this approach is that it enables us to conduct a large-sample study, which enhances the external 
validity of the results. A limitation however is that it does not allow to link negotiated loan terms 
with firm characteristics at the same moment in time. An interesting avenue for future research 
would be to use loan-specific information since this would allow a more precise measure of the 
cost of debt. In addition, information on individual loans would permit to further extend the set of 
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control variables like, for instance, other characteristics of the loan contract that might influence 
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 Notes
                                                     
 
1
  PPAk is a one-year program for individuals who wish to enter the accounting profession. This program is 
run by accredited universities and is under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education.  
2
 The smallest audit firm needs at least three persons, one chief/partner that holds a license of public 
accountant and two employees 
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Table 2. 1 :Variable definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
COD : Cost of debt; Interest expense /average debt   
BIG4 : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company was audited by a local audit firm 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm and 0 otherwise 
AUD : Categorical variable that consists of four categories: the base level category represents 
companies audited by local audit firms that are not affiliated with international audit firms, 
INTL category represents those audited by local audit firms affiliated with international 
audit firms other than a second-tier or Big4, 2NDTIER represents those audited by local 
audit firms affiliated with international second-tier audit firms and BIG4,  represents firms 
audited by local audit firms affiliated with Big4 audit firms. 
ICOV : Interest coverage; Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization/interest 
expense 
PROF : Profitability; Earnings before interest and taxes/ total assets. 
LEV : Leverage; Debt/total assets 
TANGIB : Asset tangibility; Net property, plant, & equipment/ total assets 
SIZE : Company‟s size; The natural log of total assets 
NEGEQ : Negative equity; Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the book value of equity is 
negative and 0 otherwise 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
Variable  Definition 
AGE : Company‟s age; The natural log of (1 + [year of observation – year of incorporation])  
GROW : Year over year percentage growth in sales 
CFPERF : Cash flow performance; Cash flow from operations/total assets 
Auditor selection variables 
FOREIGN : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is a foreign company and 0 
otherwise 
OWN : Percentage of closely held shares. 
CROSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company is cross-listed in the US and 0 
otherwise 
STATE : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company is state-owned and 0 otherwise 
SIZE : Company‟s size; The natural log of total assets 
ATURN : Asset turnover; Total sales/total assets 
CURR : Current assets/total assets 
LLEV : Long term debt/total assets 
LLOSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company experienced negative net income 
before extraordinary items in the prior year, and 0 otherwise 





Table 2. 2 : Sample selection method 
 drop company-
years 
Initial sample*   2,573 
 Companies that had total assets growth >100% (64)  
 Subsidiary companies (138)  
 Companies without debt (15)  
 Companies with missing values (549)  
 Final sample   1,807 










Table 2. 3: Sample breakdown by year, industry and age 
Panel A: by year Sample Initial sample* % Final sample to initial sample 
# % # % 
2008 173 9.57 274 10.65 63.14 
2009 181 10.02 280 10.88 64.64 
2010 182 10.07 297 11.54 61.28 
2011 226 12.51 313 12.16 72.20 
2012 240 13.28 329 12.79 72.95 
2013 252 13.95 349 13.56 72.21 
2014 274 15.16 361 14.03 75.90 
2015 279 15.44 370 14.38 75.41 












Panel B: by industry Sample  Initial sample* % Final sample to initial sample 
 # % # %  
Basic  materials 399 22.08 562 21.84 71.00 
Consumer goods 509 28.17 682 26.51 74.63 
Consumer services 271 15.00 451 17.53 60.09 
Health care 63 3.49 92 3.58 68.48 
Industrials 401 22.19 547 21.26 73.31 
Oil & gas 46 2.55 58 2.25 79.31 
Technology 55 3.04 109 4.24 50.46 
Telecommunication 49 2.71 57 2.22 85.96 
Utilities 14 0.77 15 0.58 93.33 
Total 1,807 100 2,573 100  
   * Initial sample of all Indonesian listed non-financial companies over the 2008-2015 period. 









Panel C: by age in years   Sample    Initial sample**  % Final sample to initial sample  
 #   %   #   %  
 up to 10 years              137             7.58              222             8.63           61.71  
 11 - 15 years              119             6.59              207             8.05           57.49  
 16 - 20 years              220           12.17              342           13.29           64.33  
 21 - 25 years              218           12.06              335           13.02           65.07  
 26 - 30 years              245           13.56              320           12.44           76.56  
 31 - 35 years              258           14.28              321           12.48           80.37  
 36 - 40 years              254           14.06              365           14.19           69.59  
 41 - 45 years              177             9.80              241             9.37           73.44  
 46 - 50 years                52             2.88                61             2.37           85.25  
 51 - 55 years                24             1.33                25             0.97           96.00  
 more than 55 years              103             5.70              134             5.21           76.87  
 Total           1,807              100           2,573              100           70.23  







Table 2. 4: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full sample 
 Mean SD p10 Median p90 Min Max 
        
COD 0.0906 0.0644 0.0276 0.0795 0.1473 0.0045 0.3673 
BIG4 0.3846 0.4866 0 0 1 0 1 
2NDTIER 0.0996 0.2996 0 0 0 0 1 
INTL 0.3985 0.4897 0 0 1 0 1 
ICOV 25.1565 69.6927 -0.1575 5.0688 44.5610 -17.3065 393.7243 
PROF 0.0761 0.1115 -0.0435 0.0729 0.1975 -0.2377 0.4209 
LEV 0.3110 0.2313 0.0360 0.2842 0.5775 0.0016 1.1286 
TANGIB 0.4056 0.2368 0.0889 0.3823 0.7468 0.0190 0.9033 
SIZE 21.3703 1.6843 19.1483 21.3429 23.6591 17.7670 24.8776 
NEGEQ 0.0487 0.2153 0 0 0 0 1 
AGE 3.2884 0.5463 2.5649 3.4012 3.8067 1.7918 4.4308 
GROW 0.1170 0.2728 -0.1808 0.1061 0.4270 -0.5195 1.0038 
CFPERF 0.0604 0.0989 -0.0457 0.0505 0.1855 -0.1595 0.3483 
        
AUDITOR SELECTION VARIABLES 
FOREIGN 0.2667 0.4424 0 0 1 0 1 
OWN 0.6825 0.1951 0.4291 0.7075 0.9194 0.1428 0.9795 
CROSS 0.1284 0.3346 0 0 1 0 1 
STATE 0.0620 0.2412 0 0 0 0 1 
ATURN 1.0181 0.7373 0.2211 0.8703 2.0198 0.0655 3.2990 
CURR 0.4796 0.2340 0.1572 0.4705 0.8015 0.0628 0.9252 
LLEV 0.1491 0.1683 0 0.0900 0.3866 0 0.7048 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
 Mean SD p10 Median p90 Min Max 
LLOSS 0.1826 0.3865 0 0 1 0 1 
ROA 0.0331 0.0931 -0.0620 0.0311 0.1285 -0.2604 0.3027 











Panel B: By audit firm type 
 BIG4 NON-BIG4 t-test  z-test  
 Mean SD Median Mean SD Median     
COD 0.0769 0.0554 0.0679 0.0992 0.0680 0.0888 -7.63 *** -9.30 *** 
ICOV 33.1803 77.1296 7.3368 20.1415 64.1398 4.1053 3.72 *** 9.72 *** 
PROF 0.1083 0.1161 0.0893 0.0559 0.1036 0.0630 9.71 *** 8.16 *** 
LEV 0.2974 0.2061 0.2741 0.3196 0.2454 0.2883 -2.07 ** -0.99  
TANGIB 0.4158 0.2144 0.3885 0.3991 0.2497 0.3784 1.51  2.00 ** 
SIZE 22.2663 1.4378 22.2373 20.8104 1.5825 20.8528 20.14 *** 18.17 *** 
NEGEQ 0.0245 0.1546 0 0.0638 0.2446 0 -4.19 *** -3.78 *** 
AGE 3.3607 0.5892 3.4340 3.2433 0.5128 3.3673 4.32 *** 5.05 *** 
GROW 0.1219 0.2366 0.1095 0.1139 0.2932 0.1038 0.64  0.85  
CFPERF 0.0846 0.1098 0.0752 0.0452 0.0881 0.0356 7.98 *** 8.34 *** 
N 695   1112       
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
The student test (t-stat) is used to compare the mean values. 
The Mann-Whitney test (z-stat) addresses the null hypothesis that both distributions are homogeneous, i.e. drawn from the same population. 









Table 2. 5: Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix 
 
 
COD BIG4 2NDTIER INTL ICOV PROF LEV TANGIB SIZE NEGEQ AGE GROW CFPERF 
COD 1 -0.2188 0.0594 0.1439 -0.1018 0.0976 -0.2335 -0.1152 -0.1962 -0.0704 -0.0155 0.0659 -0.0183 
  








*** *** *** *** 
 
** *** *** *** 
 
*** 







   
** 
INTL 0.1217 -0.6434 -0.2707 1 -0.1009 -0.0797 0.0246 -0.0302 -0.1925 0.0154 -0.0492 0.0029 -0.0835 
 









ICOV 0.0253 0.0910 -0.0268 -0.0278 1 0.7022 -0.5541 -0.1392 0.0724 -0.2190 0.1318 0.2035 0.4500 
  
*** 
   
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 






*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 






*** *** *** *** * *** 
TANGIB -0.0902 0.0344 -0.0322 -0.0267 -0.1257 -0.1683 0.2194 1 0.1196 0.0346 -0.0771 -0.0748 0.1164 
 
*** 
   




*** *** *** 
SIZE -0.1841 0.4206 -0.0981 -0.1789 0.0150 0.1442 0.0928 0.1078 1 -0.1054 0.1085 0.1030 0.1584 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** 




** *** *** ** *** 
  
*** *** 




*** *** *** ** *** 
  
*** *** 
GROW 0.0339 0.0143 0.0222 0.0038 0.0571 0.2212 -0.0770 -0.0760 0.0944 -0.1324 -0.1129 1 0.0447 
     
* *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
* 
CFPERF 0.0194 0.1938 -0.0657 -0.0883 0.2607 0.4999 -0.1877 0.1089 0.1572 -0.0400 0.1425 0.0266 1 
  
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * *** 
  
Pearson and Spearman correlations are reported below above the diagonal respectively.  
N = 1,807. For variable definitions: see Table 1. 































    
Treatment model augmented regression  
    
 CONSTANT  0.140 
   (4.87)*** 
 BIG4 (-) -0.048 
   (6.39)*** 
 ICOV (-) -0.000 
   (2.27)** 
 PROF (-) 0.047 
   (2.09)** 
 LEV (±) -0.101 
   (9.63)*** 
 TANGIB (-) -0.004 
   (0.62) 
 SIZE (-) 0.000 
   (0.10) 
 NEGEQ (+) 0.040 
   (3.81)*** 
 AGE (±) 0.001 
   (0.24) 
 GROW (+) 0.007 
   (0.93) 
 CFPERF (±) 0.004 
   (0.22) 
 Industry dummies  Yes 
 Time dummies  Yes 
First stage probit regression  
BIG4 CONSTANT  -10.921 



































N = 1,807. For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
    
 FOREIGN (+) 0.303 
   (3.95)*** 
 OWN (+) 1.162 
   (6.33)*** 
 CROSS (+) 0.250 
   (2.23)** 
 STATE (-) -0.339 
   (2.75)*** 
 SIZE (+) 0.446 
   (14.52)*** 
 ATURN (+) 0.392 
   (6.87)*** 
 CURR (+) -0.564 
   (2.79)*** 
 LLEV (±) -0.783 
   (2.90)*** 
 LLOSS (-) 0.162 
   (1.55) 
 ROA (+) 2.374 
   (5.08)*** 
Selectivity correction  
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0)  18.01 
 Prob > chi2  0.0000 
Wald chi2 for sig. of augmented regression 330.99 
   0.000 
N   1,807 
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Table 2. 7: Additional analyses 











































    
Treatment model augmented regression 
 CONSTANT  0.164 
   (4.56)*** 
AUD BIG4 (-) -0.058 
   (2.63)*** 
 2NDTIER (-) -0.043 
   (2.46)** 
 INTL (-) -0.015 
   (1.32) 
 ICOV (-) -0.000 
   (2.34)** 
 PROF (-) 0.049 
   (1.86)* 
 LEV (±) -0.099 
   (9.34)*** 
 TANGIB (-) -0.005 
   (0.75) 
 SIZE (-) -0.000 
   (0.14) 
 NEGEQ (+) 0.037 
   (3.48)*** 
 AGE (±) 0.000 
   (0.07) 
 GROW (+) 0.008 
   (1.06) 
 CFPERF (±) 0.003 
   (0.19) 
 Industry dummies  Yes 
 Time dummies  Yes 
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N = 1,807. For variable definitions: see Table 1. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
†The dependent variables on the first stage odered probit regression  is  a categorical  variable that consists four categories as follow: the base level represents local audit firms that 
are not affiliated with an international audit firm, INTL represents those audited by a local audit firm affiliated with an international audit firm other than a second-tier or Big4 firm, 
2NDTIER represents those audited by a local audit firm affiliated with a second-tier or Big4 firm and BIG4  represents those audited by a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm.
First stage ordered probit regression
†
 
AUD FOREIGN (+) 0.381 
   (5.90)*** 
 OWN (+) 0.939 
   (6.51)*** 
 CROSS (+) 0.300 
   (2.65)*** 
 STATE (-) -0.397 
   (3.10)*** 
 SIZE (+) 0.367 
   (15.06)*** 
 ATURN (+) 0.292 
   (6.00)*** 
 CURR (+) -0.311 
   (2.04)** 
 LLEV (±) -0.580 
   (2.75)*** 
 LLOSS (-) 0.122 
   (1.49) 
 ROA (+) 2.208 
   (5.56)*** 
Selectivity correction  
Corr. (e.aud, e.cod)  -0.259 
   (2.05)** 
Wald chi2 for sig. of augmented regression 325.31 
   0.000 































   Z-score
‡
  Leverage  
   LOW RISK HIGH RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK 
Treatment model augmented regression 
 CONSTANT  0.317 0.111 0.266 0.036 
   (3.85)*** (2.90)*** (4.29)*** (1.30) 
 BIG4 (-) -0.008 -0.042 -0.032 -0.047 
   (0.39) (3.80)*** (1.86)* (10.17)*** 
 ICOV (-) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (1.41) (4.16)*** (4.27)*** (3.13)*** 
 PROF (-) -0.007 0.061 0.039 0.086 
   (0.15) (2.38)** (0.98) (3.83)*** 
 LEV (±) -0.165 -0.077 -0.341 -0.050 
   (8.05)*** (5.30)*** (9.16)*** (4.78)*** 
 TANGIB (-) -0.004 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 
   (0.36) (0.55) (0.13) (1.00) 
 SIZE (-) -0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.004 
   (1.90)* (0.43) (1.47) (3.17)*** 
 NEGEQ (+) 0.155 0.029 -0.049 0.028 
   (3.46)*** (2.34)** (1.49) (3.51)*** 
 AGE (±) -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
   (0.39) (0.28) (0.06) (0.13) 
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   Z-score
‡
  Leverage  
   LOW RISK HIGH RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK 
 GROW (+) 0.027 -0.000 0.023 -0.006 
   (1.97)** (0.04) (1.84)* (1.02) 
 CFPERF (±) 0.010 0.016 0.013 -0.011 
   (0.29) (0.57) (0.40) (0.66) 
 Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage probit regression     
BIG4 CONSTANT  -12.569 -12.009 -12.543 -10.779 
   (10.53)*** (10.40)*** (10.39)*** (11.02)*** 
 FOREIGN (+) 0.573 0.105 0.657 0.173 
   (4.54)*** (0.90) (5.19)*** (1.83)* 
 OWN (+) 0.282 2.176 0.352 1.766 
   (1.00) (7.59)*** (1.33) (6.95)*** 
 CROSS (+) 0.479 -0.215 0.745 -0.083 
   (2.41)** (1.17) (3.39)*** (0.62) 
 STATE (-) -0.283 -0.434 -0.665 0.191 
   (1.37) (2.17)** (4.07)*** (0.85) 
 SIZE (+) 0.562 0.446 0.545 0.415 
   (10.58)*** (9.19)*** (10.06)*** (10.21)*** 
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N = 1,807. For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
‡Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968) is calculated  using the formula 1.2 A + 1.4 B  + 3.3 C  + 0.6 D  + 0.999 E , where A = Working capital/Total assets, B = Retained earnings/Total 
assets, C =  EBIT/Total assets, D = market value of equity/Book value of liabilities, E = Net sales/Total assets. The subsamples are divided on the median of Z-score values. 
Observations that have higher value of the Z-score median observations are classified as low risk.  
   Z-score
‡
  Leverage  
   LOW RISK HIGH RISK LOW RISK HIGH RISK 
 ATURN (+) 0.265 0.864 0.473 0.279 
   (3.59)*** (6.71)*** (5.93)*** (3.02)*** 
 CURR (+) -0.688 -0.634 -0.978 0.062 
   (2.29)** (1.96)* (3.11)*** (0.20) 
 LLEV (±) -1.300 -0.432 0.393 -0.668 
   (2.35)** (1.20) (0.40) (1.96)** 
 LLOSS (-) 0.064 0.245 0.047 0.185 
   (0.24) (1.92)* (0.22) (1.54) 
 ROA (+) 1.894 1.158 2.462 2.437 
   (2.32)** (1.56) (3.12)*** (3.23)*** 
Selectivity correction     
Wald test of indep. eqns. 
(rho = 0) 
 0.00 3.41 1.37 39.93 
 Prob > chi2  0.9829 0.0648 0.2424 0.000 
Wald chi2 for sig. of augmented 
regression 
212.63 - 231.38 284.79 
   0.000  0.000 0.000 
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This paper investigates in an emerging country, i.e. Indonesia, whether any impact of foreign 
investors and board members on auditor choice depends on whether they originate from a 
developed versus from another emerging country. We document that the likelihood of adopting a 
local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm is higher when foreign owners and board 
members originate from developed countries as compared to from emerging countries. To the best 
of our knowledge, this study is the first to argue and document evidence consistent with the idea 
that especially investors and board members from developed foreign countries demand high 
quality financial reporting and that companies respond to this by appointing local audit firms 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm. Our results show that in an emerging country like Indonesia 
especially ownership and board membership from developed foreign countries is positively 
associated with the selection of local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firms hereby 
potentially reducing information asymmetry and enhancing the access to foreign capital necessary 
to sustain economic growth. 









The aim of this paper is to explore whether foreign ownership and board membership from 
developed versus emerging countries have a different impact on the choice in favour of Big4 audit 
firms in an emerging country.  
As a result of financial markets integration and liberalization, foreign capital has become an 
increasingly important source of finance in emerging countries (Bekaert & Harvey, 2002). 
However, the flow of foreign capital to emerging countries faces many barriers, one of which 
being information asymmetry (Bekaert, 1995). Foreign investors in emerging countries have a 
particularly strong demand for transparent and reliable financial information (He, Rui, Zheng, & 
Zhu, 2014). Previous research has argued (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and documented (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1983) that an external audit can enhance the credibility of financial statements 
hereby mitigating information asymmetry problems. Especially Big4 audit firms are considered to 
be helfpful in this respect (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Choi & Wong, 
2007; Fan & Wong, 2005).  
There already exists some evidence showing that foreign ownership may affect the likelihood of 
choosing Big4 audit firms (Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2009; He et al., 2014). Foreign capital 
flows to emerging countries however do not originate solely from developed countries but also 
from other emerging countries (Kearney, 2012). We argue that the origin of the foreign 
involvement – i.e. from developed or emerging countries – should be taken into account when 
considering the effect of foreign involvement on auditor choice. Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) 
show that differences in institutional context across countries cause differences in demand for 
accounting properties. It is well-known that there are important institutional differences between 
emerging and developed countries. Companies from developed countries generally have stronger 
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corporate governance mechanisms compared to companies from emerging countries (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Therefore, when investing in emerging countries, which are already characterized 
by relatively high information asymmetries, foreign investors from developed countries probably 
attach more importance on the assurance from high-quality Big4 audit firms, as compared to 
foreign investors from emerging countries.  
A potentially related aspect of foreign involvement, next to foreign ownership, is the presence of 
foreigners in the board of a company. Foreign board membership might coincide with foreign 
ownership as a means of aligning the local company‟s actions with the preferences of the foreign 
shareholder. Alternatively, foreign board membership might be a means of the local company to 
import foreign expertise and governance culture, potentially to attract foreign capital. Foreign 
boards members, and especially those from developed countries, will probably attach relatively 
more value to high-quality audit since they are accustomed to an environment with higher 
standards on corporate governance practice (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). Therefore, we 
expect companies that have board members from a foreign developed country to be more likely to 
use a Big4 audit firm as compared to foreign board members from an emerging country.  
We test our hypotheses on a sample of Indonesian listed companies, where international audit 
firms can only enter the audit market through affiliation with a local audit firm, between 2008 and 
2016. Using a pooled probit model, we regress a dummy variable indicating whether or not a 
company chooses a Big4 audit firm on – consecutively – foreign ownership and foreign board 
membership, together with a set of control variables. To measure the origin of ownership, we 
create two dummy variables, indicating whether the largest shareholder is from a developed or an 
emerging foreign country respectively. The base category, where both dummies are zero, 
representing the case of a local  largest shareholder. For board membership we apply the same 
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approach. However, since Indonesia is characterized by a two-tier system of board organization 
that consists of “dewan direksi” (board of directors, responsible for performing managerial duties) 
and “dewan komisaris” (board of commissioners, with a supervisory role) we regress our Big4 
audit firms variable consecutively on two pairs of dummies, representing the origin of board 
foreign membership, one for each type of board.  
All financial data were retrieved from Worldscope. However, since Worldscope only provides 
data on the auditor of the latest year available, we hand-collected the data on the auditors over the 
years of the study through the ICMD. To identify membership of the boards of directors and 
commissioners, we used the annual reports. Our classification of developed and emerging 
countries follows the United Nations classification (United Nation, 2014)  
Our findings are generally consistent with our hypotheses. Regarding ownership, when the largest 
shareholder is from a foreign emerging country, we find no effect of foreign ownership on the 
probability of selecting a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of the dummy for foreign ownership from a developed country is statistically 
significant and positive. The latter effect is also economically relevant as the probability of 
choosing a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm increases with 43.0 percentage points 
moving from a local to a foreign largest shareholder from a developed country. Our hypothesis is 
also confirmed for membership. When we look at the board of directors, we find a strong effect of 
moving from a board of directors which is local to a board of directors which contains a foreigner 
from a developed country. The economic significance is an increase of the probability of selecting 
a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm with 30.7 percentage points We find a weaker 
relation when the board only contains a foreigner from an emerging country. With respect to the 
boards of commissioners, the difference between the effect of foreign board members from 
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developed and emerging countries is also in the same direction but the difference is less 
outspoken: The economic effect from moving from the base case with no foreign members in the 
board of commissioners to including a foreign member is an increase in the probability of 
choosing a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm with 15.7 percentage points for a 
member of an emerging country and 33.1 percentage points for a member of a developed country.   
This study contributes to the literature on the relationship between foreign involvement and 
auditor choice in an emerging country through differentiating by whether the origin of the foreign 
involvement is from an emerging versus from a developed country in particular. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to do so. As such, our study advances the knowledge on the effect of 
foreign involvement on auditor choice in emerging countries. Our hypothesis is based on the idea 
that foreign owners, directors and commissioners from emerging versus developed countries use 
different standards regarding and have different attitudes towards good governance practices 
which are consistent with those from their home country, hereby generating a different demand for 
Big4 auditors. Our work is related to Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo (2008), who show how a 
cultural difference – the tendency to „secrecy‟ – drives international differences in the tendency to 
hire a Big4 audit firm. For emerging countries, where information asymmetry is often hindering 
foreign direct investment, this might be an important issue.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the 
Indonesian accounting and audit environment. Then, we provide a literature review and develop 
our hypothesis. Next, we describe our research design and data collection procedure. Afterwards, 
we present our empirical findings. The last section concludes.  
73 
 
3.2 Institutional background 
3.2.1 The Indonesian accounting and audit environment 
Indonesia is a pertinent context to conduct our investigation several reasons. First of all, Indonesia 
is one of the emerging countries with the highest economic growth during the last decade. The 
annual growth rate of real GDP is about 5.9% (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri Institute, 2015). To 
maintain its growth, the country needs to rely on foreign capital. Foreign ownership is becoming 
increasingly important in Indonesia. The share of foreign investors in the stock market volume 
grew from 26.8% in 2008 to 40.58% in 2014, 43.21% in 2015, and 36.89% in 2016 (OJK, 2017). 
Furthermore, foreign capital from both developed and emerging countries is important in 
Indonesia. In our sample, the average of foreign ownership from developed countries amounts to 
10% of total share capital, while foreign ownership from emerging countries represents 18.5%. 
Furthermore, foreign board membership, both from developed and emerging countries, is also 
prevalent in Indonesia. In our sample, the percentage of foreign board members from developed 
and emerging countries is 17% and 15% for board of directors and 15% and 11% for board of 
commissioners. Similar to other emerging countries, Indonesian companies are well-known to 
have issues with weak corporate governance and suffer a reputation of low transparency and 
disclosure quality (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Fan & Wong, 2002), weak investor protection 
(Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003) and under-developed capital markets (Biddle & Hilary, 2006). 
Survey evidence from the Oliver Wyman and Mandiri Institute (2015) reveals that foreign 
investors are concerned about the lack of investor protection, bankruptcy resolution capabilities 
and the less-developed financial infrastructure. Hence, if foreign investors and board members 
from developed and emerging countries have different customs towards corporate governance and 
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the use of Big4 audit firms, we can expect these differences to be visible in a country like 
Indonesia.  
The Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007 requires corporate entities to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with the Indonesian financial accounting standards (SAKs) 
issued by the Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard Board (DSAK) (IFAC, 2016). By 
January 1, 2015, at the end of a second phase of the convergence process, the SAKs were 
substantially aligned with the IASs and IFRSs as they existed in 2014. 
The financial reports of the listed companies should be audited
1
. The Indonesian Institute of Public 
Accountants or IAPI regulates public accountants and is legally empowered to set auditing 
standards (SPAPs) for the public accountancy profession. In 2012, International Standards on 
Auditing (ISAs) (2010) were adopted. These standards are effective for listed companies for audits 
of financial statements for periods beginning on or after January, 2013 (IFAC, 2016).  
Foreign audit firms can only enter the Indonesian audit market through partnering with a local 
audit firm. Beside affiliation with international Big4 firms, many local Indonesian audit firms are 
also affiliated with other international audit firms.  
There are several indicators suggesting that there are serious quality issues within the local 
Indonesian accounting and audit context (Dunakhir, 2016). With few exceptions, most audit firms 
in Indonesia are relatively small. Many firms are audited by capacity-constrained audit firms (The 
World Bank, 2010). The local audit firms, due to lack of adequate resources, face challenges in 
providing high-quality auditing services for entities with complex business transactions. Figures 
from the World Bank (The World Bank, 2010) show that the majority of OJK registered audit 
firms have only one registered public accountant. Anecdotal evidence from interviews with 
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practicing auditors revealed high levels of compliance gaps with respect to audit planning, 
documentation, related party investigation and fraud detection (The World Bank, 2010). 
Membership of the Indonesian Institute of Chartered Accountants (IAI) is not mandatory for 
preparers of financial statements and auditors
2
, and the majority of registered accountants did not 
apply for IAI membership. Consequently, this majority is excluded from the professional training 
programs that the IAI organizes, which is not beneficial for quality improvement (The World 
Bank, 2010).  
3.2.2 Board of directors 
The Company Law in Indonesia requires firms incorporated under its jurisdiction to follow a two-
tier system of board organization that consists of “dewan direksi” (board of directors) and “dewan 
komisaris” (board of commissioners). The board of directors is responsible for performing 
managerial duties and is involved in the daily operations of the company while the board of 
commissioners is liable for monitoring and supervising the board of directors. Both these boards 
are elected by shareholders, so that both have parallel positions in the organization structure. This 
two-tier system is expected to clearly separate the management and supervising function as the 
supervisory board can monitor top management without interfering with management decisions 
(Piot, 2001). 
The appointment of an external audit firm to audit the public listed companies‟ financial 
statements is decided at the shareholders meeting. The board of commissioners, with the help of 
the audit committee, recommends external audit firms to the shareholders meeting.  
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3.3 Prior literature review and hypothesis development 
The tendency of investors to invest more in the domestic than in the foreign markets relative to 
what is implied by the standard portfolio theory – the so-called „home bias‟ – is well documented 
(e.g. Lewis, 1999). One of the explanations refers to the information asymmetries between foreign 
and domestic investors: Foreign investors find themselves less informed about a country or a 
company than domestic investors (Dahlquist & Robertsson, 2001; Lewis, 1999). In emerging 
markets, the home bias as a result of information asymmetry might even be more severe.  
Facing these information asymmetry problems, foreign investors may attach great importance to 
high-quality external audits as these can serve as monitoring and bonding mechanisms (Becker et 
al., 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Prior studies have shown that Big4 audit firms provide high 
quality audits since they have incentives to maintain their reputation (DeAngelo, 1981) or avoid 
expensive litigation as a consequence of having “deeper pockets” (Dye, 1993). Empirical evidence 
supports the idea that Big4 audit firms provide better assurance service to their clients (Francis, 
2004) and supply better audits (Choi & Wong, 2007). Choosing Big4 audit firms could be 
considered as a signal that the owners genuinely commit to accounting transparency (Guedhami et 
al., 2009).  
Foreign owners, who want to reduce information asymmetry and require credible financial 
statements, may therefore prefer that the local company hires a Big4 audit firms. Prior studies 
have already documented the relation between foreign ownership and audit choice. Guedhami et 
al. (2009), using a worldwide sample of privatized firms, document that the higher the percentage 
of foreign ownership, the more likely the firms are to choose Big4 audit firms. He et al. (2014) 
exploit the unique setting of B-share stock market in 2001 when the market was opened for 
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domestic investors. They find that the decrease in foreign ownership caused a significantly 
decrease of firms audited by Big4 audit firms.  
A distinction that has, to our knowledge, not been made in the literature is whether the effect of 
foreign ownership on the choice for Big4 audit firms differs according to whether foreign owners 
originate from a developed or an emerging country. Ball et al. (2000) show that differences in 
institutional context across countries cause a different demand for accounting properties. It is well-
known that there are important institutional differences between companies in emerging countries 
and developed countries. Emerging countries are typically characterized by lower government 
quality, weak oversight in financial markets and low investor protection (Claessens, Djankov, & 
Lang, 2000). These institutional differences fundamentally influence business organisations, 
management behaviour and the culture of corporate governance (Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011). 
Companies from developed countries commonly have stronger corporate governance mechanisms 
compared to companies from emerging countries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, when 
investing in emerging countries, which are already characterized by relatively high information 
asymmetries, foreign investors from developed countries might attach more importance on the 
assurance from high-quality audit by Big4 audit firms, as compared to foreign investors from 
emerging countries. This reasoning leads to our first research hypothesis: 
 
H1: The effect of foreign ownership on the choice for a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm is more pronounced when the foreign owner originates from a developed versus from an 




A similar distinction between developed and emerging countries pertains to the origin of foreign 
board members and their effect of the use of Big4 audit firms. Demand for foreign board members 
might arise when companies desire to tap into international financial markets (Du, Jian, & Lai, 
2017; Giannetti & Simonov, 2006; Oxelheim, Gregoric, Randoy, & Thomsen, 2013). Foreign 
board members may contribute their expertise and global networks that could lead to better access 
to foreign resources. Foreign boards members also could be a reflection of existing foreign 
ownership. As foreign investors become important, the need increases to influence the selection of 
board members (Oxelheim et al., 2013). Board selection may rely on personal networks and 
demographic similarities, shared norms and values (Kim & Cannella, 2008). Consequently, 
foreign owners may prefer to choose board members from their own countries (Oxelheim et al., 
2013). We argue that foreign boards members from developed countries will probably attach more 
value to high quality audit since they are accustomed to an environment with higher standards on 
corporate governance practice (Oxelheim et al., 2013). Therefore, we expect board members from 
foreign developed countries to be more likely to use a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit 
firm as compared to foreign board members from emerging countries. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: The effect of foreign board membership on the choice for a local audit firm affiliated with a 
Big4 audit firm is more pronounced when the foreign board member originates from a developed 
versus an emerging country.  
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3.4 Research design 
To test our hypotheses, we run the following pooled probit regression consecutively for each of 
our two research variables of interest; to wit foreign ownership and foreign board membership and 
where j and t are indexed companies and years respectively:  
 
                                                                           
                                                         
               
  
    
                      
BIG4 is a dummy variable indicating whether a company was audited by a local audit firm 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm or not. FOREIGN represents our variable of interest, foreign 
ownership and board membership consecutively. To measure foreign ownership, we create two 
dummy variables EFSH and DFSH, taking the value of 1 respectively if the largest shareholder is 
from an emerging foreign country or from a developed foreign country. The base category, with 
both EFSH and DFSH zero, represents the case where the largest shareholder is Indonesian. For 
board membership, we apply the same approach. However, since Indonesia knows a two-tier 
system of board organization that consists of “dewan direksi” (board of directors) and “dewan 
komisaris” (board of commissioners), we develop and apply consecutively two such measures, 
one for each board. For the board of directors, we create the dummy variables EFDIR and DFDIR. 
EFDIR is one when at least one foreigner from an emerging country and no foreigners from 
developed countries sit in the board of directors, zero otherwise. DFDIR is one if at least at least 
one foreigner from a developed country sits in the board of directors, zero otherwise. The base 
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case, with both EDFIR and DFDIR zero, represents the situation where no foreigners are part of 
the board of directors. For the board of commissioners, we create the variables EFCOM and 
DFCOM which are defined accordingly.  
The variables OWN, CROSS, and STATE are expected to capture the influence of agency 
conflicts on audit demand. OWN stands for concentrated ownership and is calculated as the 
percentage of closely held shares, defined by Worldscope as shares held by insiders. Concentrated 
ownership creates agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders (Fan & Wong, 
2005). Big4 audit firms can serve as a signal to mitigate agency conflicts especially in a weak 
legal environment (Choi & Wong, 2007). Fan and Wong (2005) document that high ownership 
concentration firms are more likely to choose Big4 audit firms. Therefore, we expect a positive 
coefficient on this variable. CROSS is a dummy variable indicating that a company is cross-listed 
abroad. Previous literature (Fan & Wong, 2005; Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2014) suggests that 
cross-listing may increase the company‟s choice for a Big4 audit firm. STATE is a dummy 
variable indicating that a company is state-owned. Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang (2011) argue that 
state-owned companies are less likely to choose high quality auditors since audit quality plays less 
of a role in constraining earnings management in those companies. Accordingly, we expect a 
negative sign for this coefficient.  
The audit effort is proxied by SIZE, ATURN and CURR. Size is measured as natural logarithm of 
total assets while ATURN is calculated as proportion of total sales to total assets. SIZE and 
ATURN proxy for the size and the level of economic activity of the company respectively and are 
expected to indicate the level of auditors‟ effort to achieve a sufficient level of assurance (Choi & 
Wong, 2007; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; Piot, 2001; Simunic & Stein, 1996). Following 
Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar (2004), we also include the ratio of current assets to total assets 
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(CURR) in the regression due to the complexities of inventory and receivables which may require 
specific audit procedures. We expect a positive coefficient on all three variables.   
To control for financial risk, we use LLEV, LLOSS and ROA. LLEV is measured as long term 
debt scaled by total assets. LLOSS is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of negative net 
income before extra items in the previous year. ROA, return on assets of the year, is calculated as 
net income before extra items scaled by total assets. LLEV and LLOSS are associated with the 
probability of a client‟s financial distress which is related to audit risk (Choi & Wong, 2007). 
Hence, a negative relation is expected. However, LLEV also captures potential agency conflicts. 
Chaney et al. (2004) argue that highly leveraged firms may prefer to hire high quality auditors to 
reduce agency costs. Therefore, the direction of LLEV is unclear. The variable ROA captures 
profitability. Previous studies (Chaney et al., 2004; Guedhami & Pittman, 2011) suggest that 
auditor choice might be influenced by firm‟s profitability. We expect a positive relation on ROA.   
[Insert Table 3.1 about here] 
 
3.5 Data collection and sampling procedure 
All financial data were retrieved from Worldscope. Since Worldscope only provides data on the 
auditor of the latest year available, we hand-collected the data on the auditors over the years of the 
study through the ICMD. We also hand-collected ownership data from the ICMD in combination 
with data from the annual reports. We used the annual reports to identify membership of the board 
of directors and board of commissioners. We followed the United Nations in classifying 
developed and emerging countries. The developed countries in our samples are Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US while the emerging countries include 
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British Virgin Islands, Cook Islands, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Philippines, 
Qatar, Seychelles, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and United Emirate Arab.  
[Insert Table 3.2 about here] 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes our sample selection procedure. We began with the set of non-financial 
Indonesian listed companies that existed between 2008 to 2016. Initially, we have 2,953 company-
year observations. From the initial sample, we excluded companies that experienced an asset 
growth rate of more than 100 percent in any year (69 company-years), as the latter is an indication 
of significant restructuring activities (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010). Further, to guarantee 
independent observations, we excluded subsidiary companies when the parent company was also 
included in our sample (164 company-years). Finally, we dropped 342 company-years for which 
there were missing values. Our final sample consists of 2,378 company-years over the 2008-2016 
period. Table 3.3 provides a breakdown of the sample by year and industry. Comparing our 
sample with the initial sample, there appear to be no major problems with respect to over- or 
underrepresentation of certain years or sectors. 
 
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
3.6 Empirical result 
3.6.1 Descriptive statistic 
Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. We winsorized all continuous 




 percentiles. From the table, we can infer that the percentage of audits 
that were performed by Big4 audit firms is around 38%. The number of companies using Big4 
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audit firms in Indonesia is relatively low compared to other countries. Francis, Michas, and 
Seavey (2013), for example, report that the percentages of firms audited by Big4 audit firms for 
the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia are 61%, 71%, 50%, 
72% and 53% respectively.  
18.5% (9.8%) of the companies in our sample have a largest shareholder from an emerging 
(developed) foreign country. Accordingly, 71.7% of the companies have a local largest 
shareholder. The percentage for foreign directors from an emerging country without a foreigner 
from a developed country is 15.1%. 17.5% of the boards of directors count at least one foreigner 
from a developed country. Accordingly, 67.4% have no foreign members in the board or directors. 
The percentage of the boards of commissioners with at least one foreign member from an 
emerging country, but no members from developed countries is 11.3%. 15.5% of the companies 
have at least one foreigner from a developed country. 73.2% of the boards of commissioners only 
consist of local members.  
[Insert Table 3.4 about here] 
 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations are presented in Table 3.5. BIG4 is positively related to 
DFSH, EFDIR, DFDIR, EFCOM and DFCOM. All the control variables, except long term debt 
and the proportion of current assets to total assets, are correlated with BIG4.  
 




3.6.2 Regression result 
Table 3.6 presents the results of our consecutive regressions on the relation between foreign 
ownership, foreign directors and foreign commissioners respectively and the choice of Big4 audit 
firms. We estimate our regression using pooled probit regression with industry dummies. Our 
control variables behave as expected. The coefficients of OWN, SIZE, ATURN, and ROA are 
significantly positive. The negative coefficient of LLEV is significant at the conventional level.  
Regarding our variables of interest, our hypothesis on the effect of foreign ownership is 
confirmed. The regression coefficient of EFSH is not significant: Having the largest shareholder 
from an emerging foreign country (EFSH) does not increase the probability of chosing a local 
audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm as compared to the base case where the largest 
shareholder is local. On the other hand, the coefficient of DFSH is statistically significant and 
positive: a largest shareholder from a developed foreign country increases the probability of 
choosing a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 audit firm significantly. The p-value of the Chi-
square statistic on the difference between the coefficients of EFSH and DFSH is 8.2 (p>chi2: 
0.0042) while between the coefficient of EFSH and the base level is not significant. The economic 
significance of the effect of a foreign largest shareholder from a developed country is an increase 
of 43.0 percentage points of choosing local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm compared 
to the base case of a local largest shareholder.  
Considering the effect of foreign membership of board of directors, we also see our hypothesis 
confirmed. While foreign membership from emerging countries weakly increase the probability of 
choosing local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm, there is a significant positive effect of 
foreign membership from developed countries. The p-value of the Chi-square statistic on the 
difference between the coefficients of EFDIR and DFDIR are 0.057 and 3.61 respectively, and 
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between EFDIR and base level are 0.07 and 3.28. The effect of a foreign director from a 
developed country is economically significant: compared to a board of directors with no 
foreigners, inclusion of at least one foreigner from a developed market increases the probability of 
a Big4 audit firm with 30.7 percentage points.  
With respect to boards of commissioners, the difference between of effect of foreign board 
members from developing and emerging countries is less outspoken: both the coefficients of 
EFCOM and DFCOM are significant (although the significance for EFCOM is lower). The p-
value of the Chi-square statistic on the difference between the coefficients of EFCOM and 
DFCOM are 0.1024 and 2.67. However, the difference of foreign members of commissioners 
(EFCOM and DFCOM) and the base level is significant. The Chi-square statistics on the 
difference between EFCOM and base level is 3.72 (p-value 0.0538) and between DFCOM and the 
base level is 17.54 (p-value 0.000). The economic effect from moving from the base case with no 
foreign members of commissioners to including a foreign member is an increase of probability of 
BIG4 with 15.7 percentage points for emerging and 33.1 percentage points for developed 
countries.  Overall, our results support the argument that foreign investors and board members 
especially from developed countries attach more value for high quality audit and they perceive 
local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm as being higher quality than other audit firms. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Using data from Indonesia, a typical emerging country characterized by weak governance and 
high information asymmetry, this paper provides evidence that foreign ownership and foreign 
board membership have a different impact on the probability of appointing a Big4 audit firm 
depending on whether the foreign involvement originates from a developed or an emerging 
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country. Moreover the effect of foreign involvement from developed countries is more 
pronounced for foreign ownership than board membership, and is more pronounced for 
membership of board of directors than for membership of the board of supervisors. These findings 
are consistent with the argument that foreign investors and board members from developed 
countries are accustomed to and demand higher-quality corporate governance systems and more 
financial transparency than those from emerging countries and that companies in Indonesia 
respond to this demand by appointing a Big4 audit firm. Previous research has shown that external 
audits by Big4 audit firms are associated with higher quality of financial reports, implying that in 
an emerging country like Indonesia, foreign involvement from developed countries may reduce 
information asymmetry. 
While previous research has already documented the relationship between foreign involvement 
and the appointment of Big4 audit firms, our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to 
provide evidence that the origin of the foreign involvement, i.e. from developed versus from other 
emerging countries, makes a difference and that there is a differential effect of foreign 
involvement through ownership versus through board membership.  
Our findings may be relevant to companies and regulators in emerging markets as they show that 
especially foreign involvement from developed countries may reduce information asymmetry 
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1  The requirement of audited financial statements are regulated in the Limited Liability Company Law and the 
Capital Market Law. 
2
  The membership of the professional association is not mandatory until the issuance of Ministry of Finance 
regulation No. 25/PMK.01/2014 about State Registered Accountant in 2014 (for chartered accountant) and until the 






Table 3. 1 Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition  
BIG4 : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company was audited by a local audit firm 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm and 0 otherwise 
Foreign ownership 
EFSH : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is from an emerging foreign 
country and 0 otherwise 
DFSH : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is from a developed foreign 
country and 0 otherwise 
Foreign directors 
EFDIR : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if at least one foreigner from an emerging country and 
no foreigners from developed countries sit in the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
DFDIR : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if at least one foreigner from a developed country sits in 
the board of directors and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign commissioners 
EFCOM : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if at least one foreigner from an emerging country and 
no foreigners from developed countries sit in the board of commissioners and 0 otherwise. 
DFCOM : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if at least one foreigner from a developed country sits in 
the board of commissioners and 0 otherwise. 
OWN : Percentage of closely held shares. 
CROSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company is cross-listed, and 0 otherwise 
STATE : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company is state-owned and 0 otherwise 
SIZE : The natural log of total assets 
ATURN : Asset turnover; total sales/total assets 
CURR : Current assets/total assets 
LLEV : Long term debt/total assets 
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Table 3.1 (continued) 
 
Variable  Definition  
LLOSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company experienced negative net income before 
extra items in the prior year, and 0 otherwise 
ROA : Return on assets; net income before extra items scaled by total assets. 
Industry dummy : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the industry/sector code (ICB on Datastream) 































Table 3. 2: Sample selection method 
  drop company-years 
Initial sample*  
 
2,953 
 Companies that had total assets growth >100% (69) 
 
 Subsidiary companies (164) 
 
 Companies with missing values variables (342)   
 Final sample    2,378 





























Table 3. 3: Sample breakdown by year and industry 
Panel A: by year 
Sample initial sample* 
% Final sample to 
initial sample # % # % 
2008 203 8.54 274 9.28 74.09 
2009 209 8.79 280 9.48 74.64 
2010 218 9.17 297 10.06 73.40 
2011 261 10.98 313 10.60 83.39 
2012 269 11.31 329 11.14 81.76 
2013 292 12.28 349 11.82 83.67 
2014 312 13.12 361 12.22 86.43 
2015 321 13.50 370 12.53 86.76 
2016 293 12.32 380 12.87 77.11 





















Panel B: by industry 
Sample   Initial sample* % Final sample to initial 
sample # % # % 
Basic  materials 532 22.37 637 21.57 83.52 
Consumer goods 649 27.29 778 26.35 83.42 
Consumer services 372 15.64 517 17.51 71.95 
Health care 91 3.83 107 3.62 85.05 
Industrials 521 21.91 636 21.54 81.92 
Oil & gas 55 2.31 67 2.27 82.09 
Technology 85 3.57 127 4.30 66.93 
Telecommunication 57 2.40 66 2.24 86.36 
Utilities 16 0.67 18 0.61 88.89 
Total 2,378 100 2,953 100   
* Initial sample of all Indonesian listed non-financial companies over the 2008-2016 period 








Table 3. 4: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Mean SD p10 Median p90 min max 
        BIG4 0.384 0.486 0 0 1 0 1 
EFSH 0.185 0.388 0 0 1 0 1 
DFSH 0.098 0.298 0 0 0 0 1 
EFDIR 0.151 0.359 0 0 1 0 1 
DFDIR 0.175 0.380 0 0 1 0 1 
EFCOM 0.113 0.316 0 0 1 0 1 
DFCOM 0.155 0.362 0 0 1 0 1 
OWN 0.689 0.199 0.435 0.719 0.921 0 1 
CROSS 0.401 0.490 0 0 1 0 1 
STATE 0.056 0.230 0 0 0 0 1 
SIZE 21.238 1.723 18.981 21.246 23.560 17.258 24.791 
ATURN 0.994 0.742 0.186 0.847 1.970 0.035 3.335 
CURR 0.487 0.241 0.151 0.481 0.816 0.054 0.937 
LLEV 0.135 0.169 0 0.066 0.377 0 0.705 
LLOSS 0.205 0.404 0 0 1 0 1 
ROA 0.036 0.100 -0.066 0.032 0.143 -0.273 0.324 
N       2,378  




Table 3. 5 : Pearson and Spearman correlation 
 
 
BIG4 EFSH DFSH EFDIR DFDIR EFCOM DFCOM OWN CROSS STATE SIZE ATURN CURR LLEV LLOSS ROA 
BIG4 1 0.018 0.2966 0.0863 0.3113 0.0768 0.3125 0.0767 0.2331 0.0788 0.4265 0.1417 -0.0193 0.0037 -0.0971 0.2176 
   
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
  
*** *** 
EFSH 0.018 1 -0.1574 0.2671 -0.0308 0.2514 0.0896 0.0625 -0.0317 -0.0783 -0.0398 0.0337 -0.0243 -0.0166 0.0502 0.0008 
   
*** *** 
 
*** *** *** 
 
*** * 
   
** 
 




*** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** *** * *** 
EFDIR 0.0863 0.2671 -0.0686 1 -0.1942 0.3726 0.0042 0.0406 0.0616 -0.0977 0.0714 0.0098 -0.0295 -0.0094 0.0062 0.0046 
 




** *** *** *** 
     






** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
   
*** 
EFCOM 0.0768 0.2514 -0.0686 0.3726 -0.0412 1 -0.1525 0.0451 0.0043 -0.0867 0.0042 0.0009 -0.0362 -0.0734 -0.0329 0.0548 
 









DFCOM 0.3125 0.0896 0.5652 0.0042 0.5477 -0.1525 1 0.1008 0.0368 -0.0637 0.2034 0.1068 0.0707 -0.0567 -0.0332 0.1384 
 




*** * *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 










*** * *** *** ** *** *** *** 








*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
STATE 0.0788 -0.0783 -0.0804 -0.0977 -0.0782 -0.0867 -0.0637 -0.0025 0.2416 1 0.275 -0.0162 0.0622 0.0064 -0.0829 0.1113 
 













*** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** 
ATURN 0.1241 0.0566 0.1335 0.0285 0.0446 -0.0042 0.0732 0.1178 -0.1439 -0.046 -0.1775 1 0.5976 -0.3302 -0.2732 0.3714 
 




*** *** *** ** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** 
CURR -0.0173 -0.0191 0.0849 -0.0248 0.0019 -0.033 0.0678 0.0585 -0.0733 0.0651 -0.225 0.5481 1 -0.5055 -0.2372 0.2783 
   
*** 
   
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
 




Table 3.5 (continued) 
 
 
BIG4 EFSH DFSH EFDIR DFDIR EFCOM DFCOM OWN CROSS STATE SIZE ATURN CURR LLEV LLOSS ROA 
LLEV 0.0026 0.0052 -0.0964 -0.0146 0.0342 -0.0495 -0.0095 -0.1373 0.1313 -0.0225 0.2812 -0.2814 -0.4657 1 0.1276 -0.2263 







*** *** *** 
 
*** *** 
LLOSS -0.0971 0.0502 -0.035 0.0062 -0.0334 -0.0329 -0.0332 -0.0788 -0.082 -0.0829 -0.1235 -0.2212 -0.2361 0.2088 1 -0.4547 
 
*** ** * 
    
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** 








*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
Pearson and Spearman correlations are reported below above the diagonal respectively.  
N = 2,378. For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
















CONSTANT  -10.403  -10.172  -10.141  
  (6.68)***  (6.71)***  (6.35)***  
EFSH (+) 0.183 0.066     
  (0.97) (0.95)     
DFSH (+) 1.137 0.430     
  (3.75)*** (4.25)***     
EFDIR (+)   0.353 0.129   
    (1.81)* (1.75)*   
DFDIR (+)   0.803 0.307   
    (4.08)*** (4.11)***   
EFCOM (+)     0.423 0.157 
      (1.93)* (1.85)* 
DFCOM (+)     0.863 0.331 
      (4.19)*** (4.27)*** 
OWN (+) 0.922 0.341 1.033 0.381 1.032 0.381 
  (2.75)*** (2.76)*** (3.02)*** (3.04)*** (3.05)*** (3.06)*** 
CROSS (+) 0.215 0.079 0.123 0.045 0.202 0.074 
  (1.17) (1.17) (0.67) (0.67) (1.10) (1.1) 
STATE (-) -0.293 -0.108 -0.157 -0.058 -0.212 -0.078 
  (0.95) (0.95) (0.50) (0.5) (0.68) (0.68) 
SIZE (+) 0.436 0.161 0.420 0.155 0.418 0.154 
  (6.02)*** (6.07)*** (5.94)*** (5.98)*** (5.63)*** (5.67)*** 
ATURN (+) 0.384 0.142 0.386 0.143 0.409 0.151 
  (3.15)*** (3.17)** (3.18)*** (3.19)** (3.40)*** (3.42)** 
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CURR (+) -0.593 -0.219 -0.551 -0.203 -0.630 -0.233 
  (1.60) (1.61) (1.49) (1.49) (1.73)* (1.74)* 
LLEV (±) -0.836 -0.309 -0.882 -0.325 -0.817 -0.302 
  (1.92)* (1.92)* (2.04)** (2.04)** (1.91)* (1.9)* 
LLOSS (-) 0.148 0.055 0.195 0.072 0.174 0.064 
  (1.18) 1.17 (1.56) (1.55) (1.42) (1.41) 
ROA (+) 2.182 0.807 2.200 0.811 2.021 0.746 
  (3.69)*** (3.74)*** (3.86)*** (3.94)*** (3.59)*** (3.65)*** 
Industry 
dummies 
 YES  YES  YES  
Pseudo R2  0.274  0.271  0.2729  
N  2,378  2,378  2,378  
 
 
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
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This paper investigates for a set of listed companies in an emerging country, i.e. Indonesia, 
whether the choice for local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm affects the capital 
structure. Explicitly taking into account the potential for auditor choice selection bias we 
document that companies audited by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm display 
lower debt ratios than those audited by local audit firms affiliated with non-Big4 audit firms. To 
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to provide evidence from an emerging country 
that is consistent with the idea that reduced information asymmetry through appointment of high 
quality auditors affects the capital structure. For companies in emerging countries, access to 
external capital is important for facilitating growth but is often hindered by severe information 
asymmetry. Our results indicate that the appointment of a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 





Access to finance is an important prerequisite for companies to grow (Ayyagari, Demirguec-Kunt, 
& Maksimovic, 2008; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1998). The pecking order theory argues 
that because of information asymmetry, companies will be financed using internal financing first, 
and when external financing is needed, debt financing will be preferred over equity financing 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Since information asymmetry is central in this theory, the degree of 
information asymmetry might influence companies‟ financing choices (Bharath, Pasquariello, & 
Wu, 2009; Petacchi, 2015). Previous literature has shown that one of the mechanisms to reduce 
information asymmetry is the appointment of high quality – most often Big4 –  auditors, as these 
are expected to increase the credibility of the financial statements (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, & 
Subramanyam, 1998; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1983). Therefore, one could expect that auditor choice affects the relative 
attractiveness of debt as a financing means and influences the debt-equity mix (Chang, Dasgupta, 
& Hilary, 2009). The basic intuition is the following: given that debt offers more protection than 
capital to the providers of finance, debt is – compared to equity – less sensitive to problems of 
information asymmetry. Accordingly, one might expect that hiring a Big4 auditor lowers, through 
its effect on information asymmetry, the optimal debt ratio.  
Previous research has already provided evidence consistent with this idea (Chang et al., 2009). 
However, these studies were conducted in developed countries. While some of the capital 
structure theories tested in developed markets are transferable to emerging countries, specific 
institutional features which characterize emerging countries might require country-specific 
evidence  (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001). For instance, one argument 
to expect higher quality from Big4 auditors relies on the higher risks and costs of litigation facing 
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Big4 firms (L. E. DeAngelo, 1981; Dye, 1993). The question whether this theory also holds in an 
environment of low litigation, which characterizes most emerging countries, is an empirical 
matter. To the best of our knowledge, there exist no studies that have empirically investigated the 
relation between auditor choice and capital structure in emerging countries.  
From a pragmatic point of view, the issue of information asymmetry, its effect on the finance 
structure and the role of auditors therein is especially pertinent for emerging countries as these 
suffer a reputation of low transparency and inferior disclosure quality (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
2013; Fan & Wong, 2002) coupled with weak investor protection (Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 
2003). Moreover, unlike most companies from developed countries which have diffuse ownership, 
companies in emerging countries are characterized by highly concentrated family ownership 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Given that companies in 
emerging countries are relatively more dependent on external funds to boost their economic 
growth (Atkins & Glen, 1992), the relatively high information asymmetry is a restriction with 
potentially material negative consequences for the development of companies and the country as a 
whole.  
We test our hypothesis on a sample of Indonesian listed companies between 2008 and 2015 and 
regress consecutive measures of the debt ratio on a dummy variable representing audit by Big4 
audit firms and a set of control variables. We take into account potential endogeneity concerns 
arising from self-selection. Prior research has argued that the auditor choice by companies is non-
random and related to company-characteristics but also that audit firms themselves decide whether 
they will accept or reject clients (Eshleman & Guo, 2014). Big4 firms might avoid low-quality or 
high-risk clients (DeFond, Erkens, & Zhang, 2017; Johnstone, 2000; Johnstone & Bedard, 2004) 
to minimize litigation risk. Accordingly, potential clients with significant risk of financial distress 
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as a result of high leverage might be avoided by Big4 audit firms. The endogenous nature of 
auditor choice may render standard linear regression inappropriate resulting in inconsistent 
coefficient estimates (Heckman, 1976, 1978). In order to control for this problem, we estimate a 
“Heckman treatment effect” regression which is a Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) 
estimated using the full maximum likelihood method (Greene, 2000; Maddala, 1983). In a first 
instance, we model auditor choice as a function of firm-specific variables that have been shown in 
previous literature (Chaney, Jeter, & Shivakumar, 2004; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; 
Guedhami, Pittman, & Saffar, 2014) and those that reflect the unique features of Indonesian 
setting that are  important determinants of auditor choice, i.e. foreign ownership from emerging 
countries, foreign ownership from developed countries, closely held shares, cross-listing, whether 
or not the company is owned by the state, company size, assets turnover, the proportion of current 
to total assets, long term leverage, loss occurrence in the previous year and return on assets. In our 
main regressions, we consecutively regress several debt ratios on a dummy variable representing 
whether the auditor was a Big4 audit firm, together with a set of control variables as suggested by 
prior studies (Booth et al., 2001; J. Z. Chen, Lim, & Lobo, 2016; Rajan & Zingales, 1995) 
(company size, return on assets, industry median leverage, growth and investment opportunities, 
stock return, tangible assets, debt-tax and non-debt-tax shield, and the volatility of return on 
assets). Our findings first of all show that the endogeneity problem is indeed a relevant concern in 
our sample as our Wald test result on the test whether there is correlation on the error term 
between our main regression and auditor selection regression is significantly rejected. Taking into 
account the endogeneity problem using the treatment regression, we find that the evidence is 
consistent with our hypothesis: appointment of local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm 
significantly negatively affects all of our leverage measures. The implication is that, even in a low 
106 
 
litigation environment like Indonesia, the observed finance patterns are consistent with the idea 
that Big4 audit firms increase the quality of the financial reports.  
This study contributes to the empirical literature on the link between information asymmetry and 
companies‟ capital structure in emerging countries through investigating the appointment of Big4 
audit firms as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry. For emerging countries, where 
external capital is important but achieving an optimal financial mix is often hindered by severe 
information asymmetry, our results might be of interest of policy makers, as well as managers and 
financial stakeholders. Indonesia provides a pertinent context for this research. First of all, 
Indonesia is one of the emerging countries with the highest economic growth. For instance, during 
the period 2004 to 2014, the annual growth rate of real GDP was about 5.9% (Oliver Wyman & 
Mandiri Institute, 2015). To maintain this growth, the Indonesian companies rely heavily on 
external financing, hence the choice among external financing instruments is a matter of material 
importance. Secondly, similar to other emerging countries, in Indonesia, severe information 
asymmetries often hamper the access to finance. The major causes of information asymmetry in 
Indonesia – and also other East Asian countries – is highly concentrated ownership (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). In addition, Indonesia suffers a reputation of low transparency and 
disclosure quality (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013; Fan & Wong, 2002) and weak investor protection 
(Leuz et al., 2003). In such an environment the potential impact of auditor choice on financing 
access and hence economic growth might be economically very important and worthwhile of 
study.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we provide a 
literature review and develop our hypothesis. Then, we describe the Indonesian background 
107 
 
including its accounting and audit environment. Next, we describe our research design and data 
collection procedure. Afterwards, we present our empirical findings. The last section concludes. 
4.2 Prior literature review and hypothesis development 
Central in the pecking order theory is that information asymmetry drives a hierarchical financing 
strategy: a company will prefer internal financing, and when external financing is needed, debt 
financing is preferred over equity financing (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Debt is less information-
sensitive because by issuing debt, companies offer pre-commitment that serves as a protective 
mechanism for the holders such as interest and principal payments, debt covenants and the 
possibility to force liquidation (Grossman & Hart, 1982). Equity would be the finance source of 
last resort as it is the most sensitive to information asymmetry. Consequently, firms characterized 
by higher information asymmetry would be relatively more likely to choose debt financing over 
equity, demonstrating higher leverage ratios. There exists already empirical evidence – mainly 
from the US – consistent with this idea  (Bharath et al., 2009; Petacchi, 2015). 
One particular mechanism to reduce information asymmetry is by appointing a high quality 
external auditor. Previous research has argued (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and documented (Watts 
& Zimmerman, 1983) that an external audit can enhance the credibility of financial statements 
thereby mitigating information asymmetry problems. Especially Big4 audit firms might be 
helfpful in enhancing the credibility of financial statements (Becker et al., 1998; Choi & Wong, 
2007; Fan & Wong, 2005) as it is argued that they provide higher-quality external audit services in 
order to maintain their valuable reputation (L. E. DeAngelo, 1981) or to avoid expensive litigation 
as a consequence having “deeper pockets” (Dye, 1993). Companies hiring Big4 audit firms would 
therefore be relatively more inclined to finance with equity over debt, and would thus display 
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lower leverage ratios. For the US, Chang et al. (2009) already provided evidence of a negative 
relation between audit quality and the debt ratio.  
Previous research has shown that in emerging countries external financing is relatively more 
important than internal financing (Atkins & Glen, 1992). However, compared to the knowledge on 
the effect of information asymmetry on firms capital structure in developed countries, much less is 
known about this relation in emerging countries. Booth et al. (2001) find that, although some of 
the insights in capital structure theory in developed countries can be applied in emerging 
countries, different institutional features may cause different financing patterns. Therefore we find 
it worthwhile to empirically test the following hypothesis in the context of an emerging country 
like Indonesia: 
H: Companies audited by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm display lower leverage 
ratios than those audited by other audit firms. 
4.3 Institutional background 
The Indonesian capital markets, both for equity and debt, are relatively under-developed (Biddle 
& Hilary, 2006). In 2014, the market capitalization of listed domestic companies  in percentage of 
GDP was 47% (The World Bank, 2016) and the number of companies listed is 506 (IDX, 2016). 
The public debt market in Indonesia is dominated by government bonds, which represent 70% of 
the funds raised, corporate bonds representing only 30% (IDX & IBPA, 2014). Bond market 
liquidity is generally quit low (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri Institute, 2015). The number of 
companies with listed corporate bonds in 2014 is 102 (IDX, 2016). Debt financing, through bank 
loans, is an important financial source (Oliver Wyman & Mandiri Institute, 2015). In 2014, bank 
loan funding amounted to about 58% of total corporate funding in Indonesia (Oliver Wyman & 
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Mandiri Institute, 2015). For our sample of listed firms, the average total debt ratio is about 32% 
using the market value of equity and 37% using the book value of equity while the average long 
term debt ratio is 23% and 25.5% respectively. 
The Limited Liability Company Law No. 40 of 2007 requires corporate entities to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with the Indonesian financial accounting standards (SAKs) 
issued by the Indonesian Financial Accounting Standard Board (DSAK) of the Institute of 
Indonesia Chartered Accountants (IAI) (IFAC, 2016).  
The financial reports of publicly listed companies should be audited
1
. The Indonesian Institute of 
Public Accountants or IAPI regulates public accountants and is legally empowered to set auditing 
standards (SPAPs) for the public accountancy profession.  
To pursue an audit profession career, there are several conditions that need to be fulfilled. First, a 
university graduate should pass the Professional Accounting Education Program (PPAk)
2
 to obtain 
the title of accountant and should register in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Next, a registered 
accountant has to obtain a license from the MoF to practice as an auditor but can only do so once 
certain minimum requirements are satisfied.  These requirements are that the accountant has 
passed the CPA exam held by IAPI, has sufficient audit experience, is a member of a professional 
association, is domiciled in Indonesia, and has a tax identification number. An auditor can open an 
audit office or join an existing audit office. To open an audit office, several requirements have to 
be met:  a license from the MoF, an office located in Indonesia,  the application of a quality-
control system and the employment at least two employees who have adequate knowledge of 
accountancy
3
. To provide professional audit services to listed firms in the Indonesian capital 
markets, an auditor must also be registered with OJK, an independent institution that has the 
authority to regulate and supervise the financial service sector in Indonesia. In 2010, there were 
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424 MoF–registered audit firms which are eligible to perform assurance service in Indonesia. 168 
of them are eligible to perform audit service to listed companies (The World Bank, 2010a).  
There are several indicators suggesting that there are serious quality issues within the local 
Indonesian accounting and audit context (Dunakhir, 2016). With few exceptions, most accounting 
firms in Indonesia are relatively small. Many firms are audited by capacity-constrained accounting 
firms (The World Bank, 2010a). The local accounting firms, due to lack of adequate resources, 
face challenges in providing high-quality auditing services for entities with complex business 
transactions. Figures from the World Bank (The World Bank, 2010a) show that the majority of 
OJK registered audit firms have only one registered public accountant. Anecdotal evidence from 
interviews with practicing auditors revealed high levels of compliance gaps with respect to audit 
planning, documentation, related party investigation and fraud detection (The World Bank, 
2010a). Membership of the IAI is not mandatory for preparers of financial statements and 
auditors
4
 and the majority of registered accountants did not apply for IAI membership. 
Consequently, this majority is excluded from the professional training programs that the IAI 
organizes, which is not beneficial for quality improvement (The World Bank, 2010a). 
Foreign audit firms can only enter the Indonesian audit market through partnering with a local 
audit firm. Beside affiliation with international Big4 firms, many local Indonesian audit firms are 
also affiliated with other international audit firms.  
Furthermore, in many emerging markets, regulations are not fully enforced (Ball, 2001; Chan & 
Hameed, 2006). This is also the case in the Indonesian audit environment. Cases where 
companies, shareholders or third parties sue public accounting firms are very rare. This is assumed 
to be the result of costly and time consuming courts processes, lack of experienced judges and 
laws and regulations that are perceived to be ambiguous (The World Bank, 2010b). Brown, 
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Preiato, and Tarca (2014) classified countries based on their audit environment and accounting 
enforcement and ranked Indonesia as 46
th
 of 51 countries. 
4.4 Research design 
To test our hypothesis we basically ran consecutive regressions of a set of debt ratio‟s on a dummy 
indicating whether a company was audited by a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 or not and a 
set of controls. However, to take into account potential endogeneity problems, we run a treatment 
regression using a full maximum likelihood version of the Heckman model (Heckman, 1976, 
1978) as suggested by (Maddala, 1983).  
The potential endogeneity problems arises because it can be argued that auditor choice by the 
company is not random but related to certain company characteristics which are also related to the 
debt rate. Also the audit firms themselves decide whether they will accept or reject clients 
(Eshleman & Guo, 2014). Big4 audit firms might avoid low-quality and risky clients (DeFond et 
al., 2017) to minimize litigation risk (Johnstone, 2000; Johnstone & Bedard, 2004). According to 
this reasoning, clients with risk of financial distress due to high indebtedness might find it more 
difficult to attract a Big4 audit firms.  
The self-selection bias can potentially result in biased coefficients from OLS (Maddala, 1983). 
The classical approach to control for such a selection bias is by using a Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1979). The Heckman approach uses a two-step procedure. The first step is to estimate 
a selection regression, where the choice variable is modelled and from which the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) can be calculated. The second step is by incorporating the IMR into the actual 
regression of interest, the so-called „the treatment effect model”. Alternatively, the Heckman 
model can be estimated using full maximum likelihood estimation (FIML)  to achieve more 
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efficient estimation (Greene, 2000; Maddala, 1983) since the FIML method uses all information at 
once rather than in two steps as under the IMR approach. We follow the estimation procedure 
using the maximum likelihood treatment effects estimation as suggested by Peel (2014).  
Our selection regression is as follows: 
                                                                        
                                                             
                                 
In the selection regression our dependent variable is BIG4, a dummy variable indicating whether 
the auditor was a local audit firm affiliated with a Big4 firm or not. The explanatory variables are 
in line with the literature (Chaney et al., 2004; Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005; 
Guedhami et al., 2014). To take into account the effect of foreign ownership, we create two 
dummy variables: EFSH and DFSH, taking the value of 1 respectively if the largest shareholder is 
from an emerging foreign country or from a developed foreign country respectively. The base 
category represents the case where the largest shareholder is Indonesian. Investors from foreign 
countries, and especially those from developed foreign countries demand higher quality financial 
reporting  (He, Rui, Zheng, & Zhu, 2014). Firms are expected to respond to this demand by 
appointing a Big4 audit firm. 
The variables OWN, CROSS, and STATE are intended to capture the influence of agency 
conflicts on audit demand. OWN stands for concentrated ownership and is calculated as the 
percentage of closely held shares, defined by Worldscope as shares held by insiders. Highly 
concentrated ownership creates agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Fan & Wong, 2005). Big4 audit firms can serve as a signal to mitigate agency conflicts (Choi & 
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Wong, 2007). Fan and Wong (2005) document that high ownership concentration firms are more 
likely to choose Big4 audit firms. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
CROSS is a dummy variable indicating that a company is cross-listed abroad. Previous literature 
(Fan & Wong, 2005; Guedhami et al., 2014) suggests that cross-listing may affect the company‟s 
choice for a Big4 audit firm. Again, we expect a positive sign on this coefficient. STATE is a 
dummy variable indicating that a company is state-owned. H. W. Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang 
(2011) argue that state-owned companies are less likely to choose high quality auditors since audit 
quality plays less of a role in constraining earnings management in those companies. Accordingly, 
we expect a negative sign for this coefficient.  
The audit effort is proxied by SIZE, ATURN and CURR. Size is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total assets while ATURN is calculated as the proportion of total sales to total assets. 
SIZE and ATURN proxy for the size and the level of economic activity of the company 
respectively and are expected to indicate the level of auditors‟ effort to achieve a sufficient level 
of assurance (Choi & Wong, 2007; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; Piot, 2001; Simunic & 
Stein, 1996). Following Chaney et al. (2004), we also include the ratio of current asset to total 
assets (CURR) in the regression due to the complexities of inventory and receivables which may 
require specific audit procedures. We expect a positive coefficient on all three variables.   
To control for financial risk, we use LLEV, LLOSS and ROA. LLEV is measured as long term 
debt scaled by total assets. LLOSS is a dummy variable indicating the occurrence of negative net 
income before extra items in the previous year. ROA, return on assets of the year, is calculated as 
net income before extra items scaled by total assets. LLEV and LLOSS are associated with the 
probability of a client‟s financial distress which is related to audit risk (Choi & Wong, 2007). 
Hence, a negative relation is expected. However, LLEV also captures potential agency conflicts. 
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Chaney et al. (2004) argue that highly leveraged firms may prefer to hire high quality auditors to 
reduce agency costs. Therefore, the direction of LLEV is unclear. The variable ROA captures 
profitability. Previous studies (Chaney et al., 2004; Fan, Wei, & Xu, 2011; Guedhami & Pittman, 
2011) suggest that auditor choice might be influenced by a firm‟s profitability. We expect a 
positive coefficient of ROA since more profitable firms tend to have less audit risk.  
Our so-called treatment effect regression is as follows: 
                                                              
                
                                                          
    
 
            
  
    
                      
 
In the treatment effect regression, our variable of interest is the debt ratio (DR). Prior studies 
suggest different measures for the debt ratio. Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that the effects of 
past financing decisions are best represented by the ratio of total debt to capital (the sum of total 
debt and equity). A number of capital structure studies in developing countries (Booth et al., 2001; 
Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 1999) however has shown that short term debt in developing 
countries is relatively more significant than long term debt when compared to developed 
countries. Accordingly, we use two debt ratio measures, the first measure only considers long term 
debt while the second considers both short and long term debt. To examine the robustness of the 
results, each debt ratio is calculated using as denominator either sum of the book value of debt and 
equity or sum of the market values of equity and debt. Hence we calculate four different debt 
ratios measures, LTDMEQ and LTDEQ for long term debt and TDMEQ and TDEQ for total debt. 
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LTDMEQ is defined as the ratio of long term debt to the market value of the capital, while 
LTDEQ is defined as the ratio of long term debt to book value of capital.  The total debt ratios, 
TDMEQ and TDEQ, are defined accordingly. We use one-year-ahead debt ratio measures as we 
expect that companies that  choose local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm signaling to 
outsider to have high information quality that can decrease information asymmetry, and as a result 
affect next period companies‟ capital structure. 
The control variables in this regression are consistent with prior literature (Booth et al., 2001; J. Z. 
Chen et al., 2016; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). 
Regarding SIZE, the trade-off theory predicts that large firms are generally more diversified and 
have a better reputation, leading to a lower risk of default risk. Therefore, larger firms tend to have 
higher leverage (Fama & French, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2009). The next variable is ROA. 
According to the pecking order theory firms prefer internal over external financing (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). An alternative theory, the dynamic trade-off theory, considers that firms 
accumulate profits passively (Fischer, Heinkel, & Zechner, 1989). Both theories predict a negative 
relation between profitability and leverage.  INDLEV is the industry median of  the dependent 
variable. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) provide evidence that firms adjust their debt ratio 
toward the industry average.  MTB or the market to book ratio proxies for growth and investment 
opportunities. Following Rajan & Zingales, 1995, it is calculated the sum of the book value of 
debt and the market value of equity, scaled by total assets. The relation between growth 
opportunities and leverage is unclear (Frank & Goyal, 2009). The trade-off theory predicts that 
growth reduces leverage since firms with more growth opportunities will rely more on 
shareholders‟ investment (Frank & Goyal, 2009). In contrast, the pecking order implies a negative 
relationship between growth and leverage. Higher growth firms – holding profitability fixed – 
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need more funds to finance their investments and therefore tend to accumulate more debt (Frank & 
Goyal, 2009). Following Frank and Goyal (2009), we also include the stock market return over the 
last year (RET). The market timing theory predicts a negative relation since higher market returns 
indicate preferable circumstances to issue equity.  PPE is measured as property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. Frank and Goyal (2009) suggest a positive relation between 
tangible assets and leverage since this type of assets is easier to value by outsiders which lowers 
expected distress costs. Furthermore, the tangible assets can be used as collateral (J. Z. Chen et al., 
2016). The variables DEBTAX and NDEBTAX are intended to capture the tax benefits of debt 
finance. DEBTAX is calculated as current income tax divided by pre-tax income and NDEBTAX 
is calculated by depreciation expense divided by total assets. Firms have more incentives to 
increase debt if the marginal tax rate is higher because of the higher tax deductibility of interest 
expense. The trade-off theory predicts that there is positive relation between leverage and 
DEBTAX (J. Z. Chen et al., 2016; Frank & Goyal, 2009). Non debt tax shields, like depreciation, 
on the other hand are a substitute for interest deductibles from debt (H. Deangelo & Masulis, 
1980). Firms with high depreciation have less interest in other tax deductibles like interest 
payments from debt. Therefore, we expect the relation between NDEBTAX and the debt ratio to 
be negative.  Finally, the variable SDROA is defined as the standard deviation of ROA over the 
previous three years and is a proxy for business risk that captures financial distress. It is expected 
to have a negative relation with leverage (Booth et al., 2001) as companies with more financial 
distress have less  access to debt. 
[Insert Table 4.1 about here] 
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4.5 Data collection and sampling procedure 
All financial data were retrieved from Worldscope. Since Worldscope only provides data on the 
auditor of the latest year available, we hand-collected the data on the auditors over the years of the 
study through the ICMD. Also the ownership data were hand-collected from the ICMD. To 
differentiate foreign ownership from developed and emerging countries, we followed the United 
Nations classification of emerging countries. The developed countries in our sample are Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US while the emerging countries 
include the British Virgin Islands, the Cook Islands, Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, the Philippines, Qatar, the Seychelles, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and the United 
Arab Emirates.  
Table 4.2 summarizes our sample selection procedure. We began with the set of non-financial 
Indonesian listed companies that existed between 2008 and 2015. Initially, we have 2,573 
company-year observations. From the initial sample, we excluded companies that experienced an 
asset growth rate of more than 100 percent in any year (64 company-years), as the latter is an 
indication of significant restructuring activities (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010). Further, to 
guarantee independent observations, we excluded subsidiary companies when the parent company 
was also included in our sample (138 company-years). Finally, we dropped 394 company-years 
for which there were missing values. Our final sample consists of 1,977 company-years over the 
2008-2015 period.  
[Insert Table 4.2 about here] 
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Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of the sample by year and industry. Comparing our sample with 
the initial sample, there appear to be no major problems with respect to over- or 
underrepresentation of certain years or sectors. 
[Insert Table 4.3 about here] 
 
4.6 Empirical results 
4.6.1 Descriptive statistics 





 percentiles. From the table in panel A, we can see that the yearly average of LTDMEQ and 
LTDEQ ranges 23% and 25.5%, while the mean of TDMEQ and TDEQ ranges between 32% and 
37% . Booth et al. (2001), calculating total liabilities and long term liabilities in ten developing 
countries, report total debt ratios ranging from 30% to 70% and long term debt ratios between 8% 
and 50%. 
We can infer that the percentage of audits that were performed by Big4 audit firms is around 
38.5%. It is worth noting that the number of companies using Big4 audit firms in Indonesia is 
relatively low compared to other countries. Francis, Michas, and Seavey (2013), for example, 
report that the percentages of firms audited by Big4 audit firms for the United States, Australia, 
the United Kingdom, Singapore and Malaysia are 61%, 71%, 50%, 72% and 53% respectively. 
Table 4.4 panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the variables following a partition of our 
sample based on audit firm type. The companies audited by Big4 audit firms tend to have lower 
long term and total debt ratio‟s based on the market value approach, tend to be larger, more 
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profitable, have higher growth opportunities and lower business risk as measured by the volatility 
of earnings.  
[Insert Table 4.4 about here] 
The Pearson and Spearman correlations are presented in Table 4.5. Big4 is positively related to the 
long term and total debt ratios based on the market value approach.  
[Insert Table 4.5 about here] 
 
4.6.2 Regression results 
Table 4.6 shows the results from the Heckman treatment-regression model using full maximum 
likelihood estimation . The table also shows the hazard or selectivity correction. The first Walt test 
reports whether the error terms from the first and the second term regression are correlated. The 
Wald test ratio show a p-value of 0.000 for all leverage measures, indicating that we can reject the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the treatment errors from equation (2) and the outcome 
errors from equation (1).  This result supports our decision to use the treatment effect approach. 
The second Wald test indicates whether all the variables in the second stage regression are jointly 
insignificant. Since the second Wald test show a p-value of 0.000, we can conclude that the terms 
in the treatment model regression are not jointly equal to zero.  
We note that the coefficients of our control variables SIZE and NDEBT are significantly positive 
and the coefficients of ROA is significantly negative at 1% for all our leverage measures.  
The coefficient of PPE is significantly positive for all leverage measures except for the total debt 
ratio based on the book value. The coefficients of MTB and RET are significantly negative for the 
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leverage measures based on market value. We also find that the coefficient of DEBTAX is 
significantly negative for the debt ratios based on the market value. 
The Average Treatment Effect (ATE) of being audited by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm on our leverage ratio LTDMEQ, LTDEQ, TDMEQ, and TDEQ are all significantly 
negative . On average choosing local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm is more likely to 
lower the LTDMEQ, LTDEQ, TDMEQ and TDEQ by 0.374, 0.379, 0.345 and 0.396 points 
respectively.    
 [Insert Table 4.6 about here] 
4.7 Conclusion 
This paper investigates Indonesia, which is a fast growing emerging country, characterized by 
weak governance, high information asymmetry and low litigation, whether the choice of Big4 
audit firms affects the companies‟ capital structure. We find that companies audited by local audit 
firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm tend to have lower leverage compare to those audited by 
non-Big4 audit firms. This finding support the idea that local audit firms that affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm are viewed to have better quality, thus potentially reduce information asymmetry. The 
reduced information asymmetry then impact on companies capital structure. Previous research on 
the relation between high quality audit and financing was conducted in developed countries also 
found this relation.  
For emerging countries, where external capital is important but achieving optimum financing is 
often hindered by severe information asymmetry, our result might be of interest of policy makers, 
as well as managers and financial stakeholders that reducing information asymmetry potentially 
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  Notes 
                                                     
 
1
  The requirement of audited financial statements are regulated in the Limited Liability Company Law and 
the Capital Market Law.  
2
  PPAk is a one-year program for individuals who wish to enter the accounting profession. This program is 
run by accredited universities and is under the supervision of the Ministry of Higher Education.  
3
 The smallest audit firm needs at least three persons, one chief/partner that holds a license of public 
accountant and two employees 
4
 The membership of the professional association is not mandatory until the issuance of Ministry of Finance 
regulation No. 25/PMK.01/2014 about State Registered Accountant in 2014 (for chartered accountant) and 







Table 4. 1: Variable definitions  
Variable  Definition  
DR   
LTDMEQ : Debt ratio; (long term debt + current portion of long term debt)/market value of 
equity  
LTDEQ : Debt ratio; ( long term debt + current portion of long term debt)/book value of equity 
TDMEQ : Debt ratio; total debt/market value of equity 
TDEQ : Debt ratio; total debt/book value of equity 
   
BIG4 : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company was audited by a Big4 audit 
firm and 0 otherwise 
SIZE : The natural log of total assets 
ROA : Return on assets; net income before extra items scaled by total assets. 
   
INDLV   
INDLTDMEQ 
: Industry median leverage; industry median ((long term debt + current portion of long 
term debt)/market value of equity) 
INDLTDEQ 
: Industry median leverage; industry median ((long term debt + current portion of long 
term debt)/book value of equity) 
INDTDMEQ : Industry median leverage; industry median (total debt/market value of equity) 
INDTDEQ : Industry median leverage; industry median (total debt/book value of equity) 
   
MTB : Growth and investment opportunities; market to book value of assets (total assets – 
book value of equity + market value of equity)/ total assets 
RET : Holding period stock return over the fiscal year; (ending year stock price – beginning 
year stock price)/beginning year stock price  
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Variable  Definition  
PPE : Tangible assets; Net Property, Plant and Equipment/total assets 
DEBTAX : Debt tax shield; current income tax/pre-tax income  
NDEBTAX : Non-debt tax shield; depreciation/total assets 
SDROA : Standard deviation of return on assets from the previous three years 
EFSH : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is from an emerging 
foreign country and 0 otherwise 
DFSH : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the largest shareholder is from a developed 
foreign country and 0 otherwise 
OWN : Percentage of closely held shares. 
CROSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company is cross-listed, and 0 otherwise 
STATE : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a company is state-owned and 0 otherwise 
ATURN :    Asset turnover; total sales/total assets 
CURR : Current assets/total assets 
LLEV : Leverage; long term debt/total assets 
LLOSS : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the company experienced negative net 
income before extra items in prior year, and 0 otherwise 
Industry dummy : Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the industry/sector code (ICB on 














Table 4. 2 : Sample selection method 
  drop 
company-
years 
Initial sample*  
 
2,573 
 Companies that had total assets growth >100% (64) 
 
 Subsidiary companies (138) 
 
 Companies with missing values variables (394)   











Table 4. 3 : Sample breakdown by year and industry 
Panel A: by year 
Sample initial sample* 
% Final sample to initial 
sample # % # % 
2008 191 9.66 274 10.65 69.71 
2009 204 10.32 280 10.88 72.86 
2010 204 10.32 297 11.54 68.69 
2011 247 12.49 313 12.16 78.91 
2012 251 12.70 329 12.79 76.29 
2013 274 13.86 349 13.56 78.51 
2014 297 15.02 361 14.03 82.27 
2015 309 15.63 370 14.38 83.51 









Panel B: by industry 
Sample   Initial sample* % Final sample to initial 
sample # % # % 
Basic  materials 450 22.76 562 21.84 80.07 
Consumer goods 546 27.62 682 26.51 80.06 
Consumer services 308 15.58 451 17.53 68.29 
Health care 76 3.84 92 3.58 82.61 
Industrials 424 21.45 547 21.26 77.51 
Oil & gas 44 2.23 58 2.25 75.86 
Technology 67 3.39 109 4.24 61.47 
Telecommunication 49 2.48 57 2.22 85.96 
Utilities 13 0.66 15 0.58 86.67 
Total 1,977 100 2,573 100   
* Initial sample of all Indonesian listed non-financial companies over the 2008-2015 period 













Table 4. 4 : Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: full sample 
  Mean SD p10 Median p90 Min Max 
        
LTDMEQ 0.2331 0.2625 0 0.1291 0.6735 0 0.8802 
LTDEQ 0.2553 0.2773 0 0.1735 0.6266 -0.0285 1.1348 
TDMEQ 0.3208 0.2791 0.0002 0.2644 0.7583 0 0.9054 
TDEQ 0.3694 0.3194 0.0000 0.3431 0.7262 0 1.5628 
BIG4 0.3859 0.4869 0 0 1 0 1 
SIZE 21.2130 1.7439 18.9436 21.2045 23.5690 17.2326 24.7982 
ROA 0.0365 0.1030 -0.0661 0.0319 0.1448 -0.2765 0.3428 
INDLTDMEQ 0.1398 0.0835 0.0652 0.1298 0.2553 0.0009 0.4330 
INDLTDEQ 0.1831 0.0936 0.1029 0.1671 0.2571 0.0034 0.5632 
INDTDMEQ 0.2620 0.0967 0.1838 0.2531 0.3719 0.0148 0.4732 
INDTDEQ 0.3433 0.0887 0.2719 0.3586 0.4268 0.0488 0.5640 
MTB 1.7065 1.5634 0.7087 1.1468 3.2376 0.4722 9.1356 
RET 0.1494 0.6589 -0.4772 0 0.9774 -0.7658 2.6297 
PPE 0.3912 0.2398 0.0762 0.3675 0.7440 0.0139 0.9020 
DEBTAX 0.1787 0.2122 0 0.2100 0.4010 -0.3265 0.8772 
NDEBTAX 0.0392 0.0310 0.0082 0.0323 0.0810 0.0011 0.1478 
SDROA 0.0486 0.0714 0.0053 0.0245 0.1119 0.0014 0.3774 
EFSH 0.1932 0.3949 0 0 1 0 1 
DFSH 0.1037 0.3049 0 0 1 0 1 
OWN 0.6866 0.1957 0.4320 0.7126 0.9217 0.1428 0.9800 
CROSS 0.4107 0.4921 0 0 1 0 1 
STATE 0.0607 0.2388 0 0 0 0 1 
ATURN 1.0329 0.7568 0.2047 0.8967 2.0214 0.0404 3.4305 
CURR 0.4937 0.2396 0.1572 0.4920 0.8206 0.0625 0.9366 
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Table 4.4 Panel A (continued) 
 
  Mean SD p10 Median p90 Min Max 
LLEV 0.1343 0.1674 0 0.0674 0.3752 0.0000 0.7048 
LLOSS 0.1887 0.3913 0 0 1 0 1 
N 
             
1,977       
             






















Mean SD Median Mean SD Median 
LTDMEQ        0.2065    0.2496          0.1068          0.2499          0.2690          0.1460  -3.66 *** -3.97 *** 




TDMEQ        0.2837    0.2711          0.2088          0.3441          0.2816          0.2905  -4.75 *** -4.73 *** 




SIZE       22.1474    1.4480        22.1378        20.6257          1.6562        20.6178  21.5 *** 19.2 *** 
ROA        0.0689    0.1048          0.0530          0.0161          0.0965          0.0238  11.25 *** 10.17 *** 
















MTB        1.9929    1.7466          1.3657          1.5265          1.4075          1.0734  6.21 *** 8.56 *** 




PPE        0.4043    0.2129          0.3773          0.3829          0.2551          0.3547  2.01 ** 2.64 *** 
DEBTAX        0.2203    0.2089          0.2499          0.1526          0.2101          0.1111  6.99 ** 8.65 *** 
NDEBTAX        0.0428    0.0283          0.0374          0.0369          0.0324          0.0285  4.27 *** 7.45 *** 
SDROA        0.0426    0.0542          0.0259          0.0524          0.0802          0.0232  -3.24 *** 1.71 * 




DFSH        0.2189    0.4138  0         0.0313          0.1742  0 11.88 *** 13.31 *** 
OWN        0.7139    0.1726          0.7278          0.6695          0.2071          0.7070  5.15 *** 3.94 *** 
CROSS        0.5544    0.4974  1         0.3204          0.4668  0 10.42 *** 10.29 *** 
STATE        0.0865    0.2813  0         0.0445          0.2062  0 3.56 *** 3.81 *** 













Mean SD Median Mean SD Median 












      
 
For variable definitions: see Table 1. 
The student test (t-stat) is used to compare the mean values 
The Mann-Whitney test (z-stat) addresses the null hypothesis that both distributions are homogeneous, i.e. drawn from the same population. 




Table 4. 5 : Pearson & Spearman correlation 
 
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ BIG4 SIZE ROA INDLTDMEQ INDLTDEQ INDTDMEQ INDTDEQ MTB RET PPE DEBTAX NDEBTAX SDROA 
                  
LTDMEQ 1 0.845 0.808 0.695 -0.089 0.303 -0.385 0.165 0.147 0.141 0.136 -0.221 -0.171 0.361 -0.151 0.235 -0.045 
  
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** 






*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 




*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
TDEQ 0.641 0.748 0.732 1 -0.023 0.259 -0.361 0.125 0.113 0.122 0.155 -0.079 -0.083 0.208 -0.117 0.113 -0.074 
 
*** *** *** 
  
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 







    
*** 
 
*** *** *** * 
SIZE 0.267 0.325 0.163 0.184 0.425 1 0.121 0.114 0.091 0.084 0.123 0.116 -0.041 0.160 0.112 0.084 -0.110 
 
*** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** 
ROA -0.354 -0.272 -0.392 -0.364 0.250 0.152 1 -0.192 -0.092 -0.177 -0.084 0.335 0.322 -0.197 0.420 -0.089 -0.100 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
INDLTDMEQ 0.180 0.164 0.151 0.126 0.033 0.177 -0.152 1 0.630 0.909 0.611 -0.171 -0.208 0.117 -0.067 0.138 0.037 
 




*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
INDLTDEQ 0.162 0.208 0.105 0.120 0.018 0.201 -0.106 0.742 1 0.484 0.517 -0.017 -0.029 0.128 0.004 0.175 -0.065 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 







INDTDMEQ 0.166 0.133 0.169 0.137 0.008 0.112 -0.146 0.863 0.585 1 0.678 -0.202 -0.222 0.110 -0.064 0.103 0.037 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** * 
INDTDEQ 0.172 0.178 0.167 0.164 -0.002 0.167 -0.111 0.689 0.703 0.768 1 -0.098 -0.071 0.140 0.007 0.063 -0.018 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
*** *** *** *** *** 
 




MTB -0.237 -0.126 -0.333 -0.106 0.145 -0.038 0.301 -0.157 -0.079 -0.179 -0.116 1 0.317 -0.026 0.060 0.088 0.135 
 




*** *** *** 
RET -0.175 -0.080 -0.184 -0.081 0.025 -0.022 0.230 -0.149 -0.032 -0.160 -0.057 0.220 1 -0.079 0.135 -0.029 -0.067 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
 
 
LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ BIG4 SIZE ROA INDLTDMEQ INDLTDEQ INDTDMEQ INDTDEQ MTB RET PPE DEBTAX NDEBTAX SDROA 
PPE 0.324 0.300 0.200 0.168 0.043 0.139 -0.179 0.140 0.188 0.139 0.197 0.009 -0.077 1 -0.172 0.551 0.044 
 




*** *** ** 
DEBTAX -0.158 -0.107 -0.127 -0.123 0.155 0.098 0.278 -0.026 -0.012 -0.020 -0.023 -0.011 0.093 -0.144 1 -0.052 -0.277 
 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 




NDEBTAX 0.204 0.205 0.109 0.169 0.093 0.015 -0.182 0.177 0.267 0.105 0.123 0.118 -0.032 0.456 -0.076 1 0.093 
 
*** *** *** *** *** 
 





SDROA 0.017 -0.008 -0.028 0.064 -0.067 -0.191 -0.169 0.002 -0.025 0.004 0.004 0.185 -0.043 0.032 -0.239 0.149 1 
    
*** *** *** *** 






Pearson and Spearman correlations are reported below above the diagonal respectively.  




 Table 4. 6 : Regression result 
 
   LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ 
Treatment model augmented regression     
       
 CONSTANT  -1.521 -1.792 -1.090 -1.617 
   (20.06)*** (21.15)*** (11.44)*** (12.72)*** 
 BIG4 (-) -0.374 -0.379 -0.345 -0.396 
   (21.52)*** (24.17)*** (13.28)*** (12.69)*** 
 SIZE (+) 0.088 0.102 0.071 0.094 
   (25.01)*** (25.66)*** (16.39)*** (16.44)*** 
 ROA (-) -0.380 -0.445 -0.531 -0.863 
   (5.49)*** (5.02)*** (6.71)*** (7.37)*** 
 INDLTMDEQ (+) 0.015    
   (0.12)    
 INDLTDEQ (+)  -0.049   
    (0.30)   
 INDTDMEQ (+)   0.274  
     (2.84)***  
 INDTDEQ (+)    0.422 
      (3.50)*** 
 MTB (±) -0.021 0.004 -0.037 0.010 
   (6.21)*** (0.78) (9.74)*** (1.43) 
 RET (±) -0.025 -0.001 -0.027 -0.000 
   (3.52)*** (0.08) (3.08)*** (0.01) 
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
   LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ 
 PPE (+) 0.165 0.104 0.078 -0.046 
   (6.37)*** (3.60)*** (2.72)*** (1.28) 
 DEBTAX (±) -0.087 -0.045 -0.069 -0.052 
   (3.26)*** (1.57) (2.50)** (1.77)* 
 NDEBTAX (±) 1.085 0.877 0.907 1.366 
   (5.08)*** (3.28)*** (3.78)*** (3.91)*** 
 SDROA (-) 0.054 0.022 -0.052 0.186 
   (0.57) (0.20) (0.46) (1.12) 
 Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
First stage probit regression     
BIG4 CONSTANT  -9.004 -10.212 -8.823 -9.636 
   (15.92)*** (16.09)*** (13.72)*** (15.06)*** 
 EFSH (+) 0.135 0.113 0.236 0.225 
   (2.32)** (1.71)* (3.60)*** (3.15)*** 
 DFSH (+) 0.585 0.445 0.785 0.526 
   (4.74)*** (3.24)*** (5.92)*** (3.64)*** 
 OWN (+) 0.873 0.806 0.870 0.779 
   (5.79)*** (5.43)*** (5.13)*** (4.50)*** 
 CROSS (+) 0.230 0.078 0.335 0.226 
   (3.64)*** (1.32) (4.90)*** (3.36)*** 
 STATE (-) 0.060 -0.196 0.048 -0.183 
   (0.73) (2.40)** (0.53) (2.05)** 
 SIZE (+) 0.389 0.453 0.377 0.422 
   (15.67)*** (15.58)*** (13.68)*** (14.94)*** 
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
   LTDMEQ LTDEQ TDMEQ TDEQ 
 ATURN (+) 0.269 0.174 0.197 0.133 
   (6.63)*** (3.71)*** (3.92)*** (2.32)** 
 CURR (+) -0.741 -0.330 -0.843 -0.567 
   (4.27)*** (1.77)* (4.65)*** (3.01)*** 
 LLEV (-) -2.736 -3.439 -2.149 -2.465 
   (10.46)*** (11.32)*** (8.18)*** (8.30)*** 
 LLOSS (-) -0.032 -0.091 -0.037 -0.196 
   (0.35) (1.00) (0.38) (1.82)* 
 ROA (+) 1.642 1.179 2.204 1.929 
   (3.81)*** (2.63)*** (4.88)*** (4.25)*** 
Selectivity correction     
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0)  241.73 261.91 114.83 102.47 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wald chi2 for sig. of augmented regression 1439.87 1447.92 942.32 585.62 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N   1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 
 
N = 1,977. For variable definitions: see Table 1. 














This dissertation documents the determinants and the consequences of auditor choice in one of 
emerging countries, Indonesia. Indonesia is characterized by low litigation environment and Big4 
audit firms can only enter the market through affiliation of local audit firms. First, it provides 
evidence that the choice of local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm is beneficial for 
companies in term of lowering cost of debt and optimization of debt-equity mix. Second, it 
provides evidence that the choice of Big4 audit firms is affected by the home country of foreign 
ownership and foreign board membership, whether they originate from developed or emerging 
countries.  
The main conclusion of this dissertation is that international reputable audit firms is viewed to 
have high quality and add credibility to financial information, thus, reduce information asymmetry 
(Datar, Feltham, & Hughes, 1991) even in less-litigious environment. This is in contrast with the 
view that reputable audit firms will fail to play a role as governance function as weak legal 
environments may fail to incentivize audit firms to provide high quality audits (Francis, Khurana, 
& Pereira, 2003; Francis & Wang, 2008). On the other hand, this dissertation supports the view 
that in weak legal environments, high quality audit firms play stronger role as they may serve as 
firm-level governance substitutes (Fan & Wong, 2005; Gomes, 2000; Klapper & Love, 2004; 
LaPorta, LopezDeSilanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997) or they may play a more significant role in 
signaling to reduce information asymmetry (Datar et al., 1991).  
5.1 Summary of the individual article 
First article 
Based on the idea that high quality auditor may substitute governance role in weak legal 
environment (Choi & Wong, 2007; Fan & Wong, 2005), the first study investigates whether there 
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is a relationship between local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firmand cost of debt for 
listed Indonesian companies. 
The main finding in this article provides evidence that companies audited by local audit firms 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm enjoy significantly lower interest rate. This finding consistents 
with the idea that lenders perceive Big4 audit firms add credibility to financial information as they 
have good reputation.  
This article extends to the prior literature on the role of high quality audit and cost of capital by 
providing evidence that even in less-litigious environment, the choice of local audit firms 
affiliated with a Big4 audit firm is valued by lenders in term of reduced interest rate.   
Second article 
The second article investigates whether any impact of foreign investors and board members on 
auditor choice depends on whether they originate from a developed versus from another emerging 
country. The rationale of this article is derived from the work of Hope, Kang, Thomas, and Yoo 
(2008) that cultural differences drive different tendencies of auditor choice. Moreover, Ball, 
Kothari, and Robin (2000) show that differences in institutional context across countries cause 
differences in demand for accounting properties. We argue that foreign investors and board 
members from developed countries probably attach more importance on the assurance from high 
quality Big4 audit firms, as compared to foreign investors from emerging countries. The findings 
of this article highlight that in an emerging country like Indonesia especially ownership and board 
membership from developed foreign countries is positively associated with the selection of Big4 
audit firms hereby potentially reducing information asymmetry and enhancing the access to 
foreign capital necessary to sustain economic growth. 
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This article contributes to the literature on the impact of foreign involvement on the choice of 
Big4 audit firms through differentiating by whether the origin of the foreign involvement is from 
an emerging versus from a developed country in particular.  
Third article 
The third article studies whether the choice of Big4 audit firms affect the capital structure of the 
company. The basic intuition is that given that debt offers more protection than capital to the 
providers of finance, debt is – compared to equity – less sensitive to problems of information 
asymmetry. Accordingly, one might expect that hiring a Big4 auditor, through its effect on 
information asymmetry, lowers the optimal debt ratio.  
The result of the article shows that companies audited by local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 
audit firm display lower debt ratios than those audited by other audit firmst. It supports the idea 
that local audit firms affiliated with a Big4 audit firm are perceived to have higher quality 
assurance that potentially reduced information asymmetry. The reduced information asymmetry 
then impact the capital structure of the companies.  
This study contributes to the empirical literature on the link between information asymmetry and 
companies‟ capital structure in emerging countries through investigating the appointment of Big4 
audit firms as a mechanism to reduce information asymmetry. 
5.2 Implications for practice 
In addition to contributing to the academic literature, the findings in this dissertation may on the 
interest of practitioners. Firstly, managers from emerging countries can learn from this dissertation 
that auditor choice is indeed valued by the stakeholders as it is important in decreasing 
information asymmetry and increase the credibility of financial information. The auditor choice 
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may help them in lowering cost of capital and set the optimal debt-equity mix to maximize 
company‟s value and finance companies‟ future growth. Secondly, regulators from emerging 
countries may also have interest in this dissertation as this dissertation shows that in a weak legal 
environment setting, Big4 audit firms can still maintain, - or at least are perceived to maintain – 
their high quality audits. This may be attributed to their international reputation (Beatty, 1989; 
Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995).   
5.3 Limitations and avenue for future research 
A first limitation of this dissertation is that the benefit of Big4 audit firms in the context of debt-
contracting is limited to the effect on the interest rate. It would be interesting to consider other 
aspects, for instance the debt maturity, the nature of the covenants and the required collateral. This 
study uses firm-level instead of loan-level data to assess the cost of debt. An advantage of this 
approach is that it enables us to conduct a large-sample study, which enhances the external 
validity of the results. A limitation however is that it does not allow to link negotiated loan terms 
with firm characteristics at the same moment in time. An interesting avenue for future research 
would be to use loan-specific information since this would allow a more precise measure of the 
cost of debt. In addition, information on individual loans would permit to further extend the set of 
control variables like, for instance, other characteristics of the loan contract that might influence 
the interest rate.  
The second limitation is that this dissertation capture high quality audit only on the perceived audit 
quality by user of financial statements. While actual audit quality is difficult to measure (Knechel, 
Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury, 2013), other aspects of audit quality might be worth to 
explore. Another venue for future research that could be promising is to explore whether Big4 and 
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non-Big4 dichotomy is translated into audit quality in different aspects such as tax aggressiveness 
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